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ABSTRACT
Eminent domain is a minimal constitutional protection for private
property and one that is subject to far more discretion than previously
recognized by scholars. This Article traces a novel legal history of land
takings within the U.S. Territories, focusing on some of the most egregious
and controversial incidents and problematic patterns originating within
eminent domain law. Comparing this history to recent research that
demonstrates how takings in the States have disproportionately impacted
Black communities, this Article articulates three patterns of injustices in
takings echoing between Black mainland communities and indigenous
communities in the Territories: large-scale federally funded actions, local
government takings that demonstrate bias and disproportionately impact
minority communities, and delayed and inadequate compensation.
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Each of these patterns provides insight into how eminent domain law
has failed to adequately protect private property. The result is a picture of
how eminent domain law is doctrinally destined to fail at protecting
property, particularly in communities with limited political power.
This Article proposes three specific and complementary routes to
achieving more just property protections. Specifically, the Supreme Court
should: (1) overturn Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railroad Co., a
decision which justifies delayed compensation and is inconsistent with
other doctrines for just compensation; (2) recognize the dangers of
unfettered legislative discretion and, consistent with equal protection law,
utilize a more intensive review in the context of takings in Black and
indigenous communities; and (3), if an appropriate case were to present
itself, articulate a standard for equal protection violations in the context of
eminent domain.
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INTRODUCTION
Eminent domain is a minimal constitutional protection for property.1
The government cannot take your property unless there is a public purpose
for that property2 and just compensation is paid.3 A judicial affirmation of
public purpose effectively ends any challenge to the taking, except for the
point of appropriate compensation. In other words, the Fifth Amendment
does little more than “exact[] . . . the price of the taking,”4 with no
requirement of payment before dispossession.5 The Supreme Court has
endorsed a policy of “deference to legislative judgments.”6 Even if the
1. There is an opportunity for judicial review in eminent domain, “but the Supreme
Court has repeatedly ‘made clear that it is “an extremely narrow” one.’” Goldstein v.
Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)).
Courts cautiously note that “individuals whose properties are taken are entitled to some
judicial process.” Tioronda, LLC v. State, 386 F. Supp. 2d 342, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
2. This public/private line is fluid: “[q]uite simply, the government’s pursuit of a
public purpose will often benefit individual private parties.” Kelo v. City of New London,
545 U.S. 469, 486 (2005). Only “[a] purely private taking” is forbidden. See Haw. Hous.
Auth. V. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984).
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”); see also Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining
Co., 196 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1905) (interpreting the public purpose requirement and
compensation requirement as two distinct barriers for a constitutional taking).
4. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954).
5. In Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co., the Supreme Court held that
compensation need not be paid before dispossession; there need only be provisions made
for payment. 135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890). This decision supported an extensive history of
land takings for which compensation was delayed for decades. See also Transcon. Gas Pipe
Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 F.3d 725, 737 (3d Cir. 2018)
(holding that compensation “need not be paid contemporaneously”).
6. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480 (“Without exception, our cases have defined [public
purpose] broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments
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constitutional protections are limited, eminent domain law applies within
the U.S. Territories, unlike many other constitutional norms.7 Yet when
compared to the States, where extensive scholarship illustrates the legal
history of eminent domain, the legal history of eminent domain within the
Territories remains rather murky. This lack of clarity persists despite an
abundance of instances for study, including multiple pending disputes.8
This Article traces a novel legal history of takings within the U.S.
Territories, focusing on some of the most egregious and controversial
incidents and developing patterns of problems originating within eminent
domain law. Comparing this history to recent research demonstrating that
takings in the States have disproportionately impacted Black communities,
this Article articulates three patterns of injustices in takings that echo
between Black mainland communities and indigenous communities in the
Territories. Each facet of these patterns provides insight into the failures
of eminent domain law in adequately protecting private property. The
result is a picture of how eminent domain law is doctrinally destined to
fail at protecting property in communities with limited political power.
This Article argues three essential failures. First, legislative
discretion invites racial bias in the context of deciding two key questions
that underpin eminent domain actions: who belongs there and what use of
the land is best. Second, courts allow municipalities and agencies to delay
and defer payments on eminent domain claims for years—even decades—
after confiscation. Finally, no other area of law (such as equal protection
or due process) intervenes to provide adequate property protection. After
examining these failures, this Article proposes three specific and
complementary routes to achieving more just property protections in the
context of eminent domain.
Part I provides a history of takings—takings that either intentionally
target people based on race, class, and ethnicity or fail to provide fair
compensation—across the five U.S. Territories, focusing on some of the
most egregious and controversial incidents and developing patterns of
problems that originate within eminent domain law.
Part II explains the unique risks of eminent domain for communities
with limited political power, such as the U.S. Territories and
predominantly minority communities within the States. First, Part II
discusses the history of unjust takings in the States that have
disproportionately impacted Black communities. Second, Part II explains
the risks of governments having substantial discretion over eminent
domain in minority communities. Parts I and II together form a critique of
in this field.”); see also id. at 472 (reaffirming the “longstanding policy of deference to
legislative judgments in this field” (citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241)).
7. See infra Part I.
8. See infra Part I.
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how eminent domain law has failed to adequately protect property rights
in a way that is consistent with the Fifth Amendment, particularly those
property rights of the most vulnerable and disenfranchised communities.
The final section of Part II summarizes the resonant patterns between
mainland Black and indigenous experiences in the Territories with land
takings.
Part III considers and rejects the idea that other areas of law, such as
equal protection and due process, may intervene to provide adequate
property protections.
Part IV then offers three specific and complementary routes to
achieving more just property protections in the eminent domain context.
Part IV argues that the Supreme Court should (1) overturn Cherokee
Nation v. Southern Kansas Railroad Co., which justifies delayed
compensation; (2) recognize the dangers of unfettered legislative
discretion—which is also effectively municipal discretion—and more
robustly enforce, at a minimum, an enhanced rational basis test; and (3), if
an appropriate case were to present itself, articulate a standard for an equal
protection violation based on a development project inappropriately
targeting a protected class.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF TAKINGS IN THE U.S. TERRITORIES

This Part begins with a discussion of the constitutional status of
property protections in the Territories, examining the so-called Insular
Cases to determine the applicability of the Fifth Amendment property
protections. After affirming the applicability of constitutional norms, this
Part combines strands of history from across the five U.S. Territories to
generate a history of unjust takings across the Territories. These histories
demonstrate similar patterns of injustices that will be used to illustrate
specific problems with eminent domain law’s ability to effectively protect
property, particularly in minority communities9 and, by extension, all
other communities that lack political power.
9. American Samoa has a population of 46,366, and over 92% of this population is
Pacific Islander. See CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, EXPLORE ALL COUNTRIES – AMERICAN
SAMOA (2022), https://bit.ly/346wXW5. Guam’s population is 168,801, of which only 7%
is white. Chamorro, the local indigenous group, makes up 37.3% of Guam’s population,
with Filipino constituting another 26.3%. See CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, EXPLORE ALL
COUNTRIES – GUAM (2022), https://bit.ly/35aCJGQ. The Northern Mariana Islands have a
population of 51,659. The racial distribution of this population includes 50% Asian and
34.9% Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander. See CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK,
EXPLORE ALL COUNTRIES – NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS (2022), https://bit.ly/3tSqycd.
The U.S. Virgin Islands population is 105,870, which is 76% Black. See CIA, THE WORLD
FACTBOOK, EXPLORE ALL COUNTRIES – VIRGIN ISLANDS (2022), https://bit.ly/3qUPopV.
Puerto Rico has a population of 3,142,779, with a racial distribution of: 75.8% white or
Hispanic, 12.4% Black/African American, and 8.5% other. See CIA, THE WORLD
FACTBOOK, EXPLORE ALL COUNTRIES – PUERTO RICO (2022), https://bit.ly/3tUmgRo.
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A. Application of Constitutional Property Doctrines Within the
Territories
The U.S. Territories present a unique problem for constitutional
questions because, as a direct product of the Insular Cases,10 ordinary
constitutional protections do not necessarily apply within the Territories.11
The Insular Cases, decided between 1900 and 1922, considered whether
constitutional protection, either generally or individually, applied to the
U.S. Territories. The Supreme Court decided that the answer to this
question “involves an inquiry into the situation of the Territory and its
relations to the United States.”12 In other words, there is no single and
straightforward answer to the question; the answer is a “flexible and
pragmatic approach.”13 The flexibility is a logical consequence of the
pragmatic: “the Constitution in the Insular Cases did not require Congress
to implement all constitutional guarantees in its [T]erritories because of
their wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions.”14
However, this approach has “become controversial” because the
Insular Cases’ decisions may be viewed “as amounting to a license for
further imperial expansion and having been based at least in part on racist
ideology.”15 These critiques of the theoretical underpinnings of the Insular
Cases are essentially impossible to dispute: the decisions explicitly

10. The “Insular Cases” is the common term used collectively for Hawaii v.
Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); and,
sometimes, Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) and Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S.
298 (1922). For the sake of simplicity, this Article adopts the broader reference to all four
cases.
11. The relationship is unusual, or, in the recent words of the Tenth Circuit, simply a
result of the “flexibility” that defines the “broader approach of the political and judicial
branches applied to the [T]erritories.” See Fitisemanu v. United States, 1 F.4th 862, 867
(10th Cir. 2021); see generally Alan Tauber, The Empire Forgotten: The Application of
the Bill of Rights to U.S. Territories, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 147 (2006) (discussing the
history of territorial governance, the history of the Insular Cases, and the development of
the territorial incorporation doctrine); Juan R. Torruella, Ruling America’s Colonies: The
Insular Cases, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 57 (2013) (analyzing the relationship between the
U.S. and Puerto Rico, as created by the Supreme Court via the Insular Cases).
12. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 293 (1901).
13. Fitisemanu v. United States, 1 F.4th 862, 869 (10th Cir. 2021) (citing Balzac v.
Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 305 (1922)).
14. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Fitisemanu, 1 F.4th at 870; see also Russell Rennie, Note, A Qualified Defense
of the Insular Cases, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1683, 1688 (2017) (discussing the racist and
expansionist reasoning of the Insular Cases, but arguing their ability to now protect local
self-government within the Territories).
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acknowledged both their focus on “empire”16 and their rationale of making
decisions based on “differences of race.”17
Despite its unpleasant underpinnings, the Supreme Court has
continued to apply the Insular Case framework, focusing on two features
that may be particularly appealing to a member of the judiciary: flexibility
and pragmatism. The heart of the question of whether a constitutional
protection applies is “whether judicial enforcement of the provision would
be ‘impracticable and anomalous.’”18 Focusing on “the inherent practical
difficulties of enforcing all constitutional provisions ‘always and
everywhere,’ the Court devised in the Insular Cases a doctrine that allowed
it to use its power sparingly and where it would be most needed.”19
Moreover, the doctrine allowed the judiciary to revisit the question as
necessary because “over time the ties between the United States and any
of its unincorporated Territories [may] strengthen in ways that are of
constitutional significance.”20 Such “practical considerations” have
repeatedly been the central feature of the Supreme Court’s approach to
applying the Constitution in the Territories.21 After considering decades of
precedents, Justice Kennedy concluded that “questions of
extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not
formalism.”22 As the Tenth Circuit concluded, “the lodestar of the Insular
framework has come to be the ‘impracticable and anomalous’ standard.
Under this standard, ‘the question is which guarantees of the Constitution
should apply in view of the particular circumstances, the practical
necessities, and the possible alternatives which Congress had before it.’”23
This flexibility is particularly logical given that political status and the
right to self-government vary across different Territories.24
16. Fitisemanu, 1 F.4th at 870 (quoting Downes, 182 U.S. at 286). The Tenth Circuit
noted that the Insular Cases explicitly recognized their own role in the colonial expansion
of the U.S. See id.; see generally BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND
THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (2006) (explaining the role the Insular Cases played
in the process of determining the physical bounds of the United States and the applicability
of the U.S. Constitution in the Territories).
17. Fitisemanu, 1 F.4th at 870 (quoting Downes, 182 U.S. at 286).
18. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 759 (2008) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1, 74–75 (1957)).
19. Id. at 759 (quoting Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312).
20. Id. at 758.
21. See id. at 759 (“[W]hether a constitutional provision has extraterritorial effect
depends upon the ‘particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible
alternatives which Congress has before it’ and, in particular, whether judicial enforcement
of the provision would be ‘impracticable and anomalous.’” (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 74–
75)).
22. Id. at 764.
23. Fitisemanu v. United States, 1 F.4th 862, 870 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1956) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
24. See, e.g., Northern Mariana Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682, 687 (9th Cir. 1984)
(contrasting the Northern Marina Islands’ right to self-governance against the political
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The exception to flexible pragmatism comes from the “constitutional
provisions that implicate fundamental personal rights,” which “apply
without regard to local context.”25 Essentially, “even in cases where there
is no direct command of the Constitution which applies, there may
nevertheless be restrictions of so fundamental a nature that they cannot be
transgressed, although not expressed in so many words in the
Constitution.”26
The term ‘fundamental’ has a particular meaning in the context of
territorial rights, which does not align with other usages of the term by the
Supreme Court.27 Additionally, across the circuits, definitions of
fundamental do not neatly align.28 The Ninth Circuit has defined
fundamental in the negative: it is not sufficient that a right be considered
fundamentally important in a colloquial sense or even that a right be
“‘necessary to [the] . . . American regime of ordered liberty.’”29
Conversely, the D.C. Circuit states more generally that fundamental refers
to “those rights so basic as to be integral to free and fair society.”30 These
fundamental rights may be contrasted with “those artificial, procedural, or
remedial rights that—justly revered though they may be—are nonetheless
idiosyncratic to the American social compact or to the Anglo-American
tradition of jurisprudence.”31 For the purposes of this Article, such
differences can be set aside. The key question is narrower: whether the
Territories enjoy a constitutional protection against governmental
confiscation32 of land for public use without just compensation.
status of Guam, which is “subject to the plenary power of Congress and has no inherent
right to govern itself”).
25. Fitisemanu, 1 F.4th at 878.
26. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 147 (1904) (quoting Downes v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 244, 265 (1901)).
27. Particularly, the concept of fundamental rights within the Insular Cases’
framework does not align with the Duncan analysis for the incorporation of rights in the
Bill of Rights to apply to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment. See Atalig, 723 F.2d
at 690 (discussing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)); see also King v. Morton,
520 F.2d 1140, 1146–47 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (distinguishing Duncan as applying within the
States rather than the U.S. Territories).
28. For further discussion of the circuit differences, see Robert A. Katz, The
Jurisprudence of Legitimacy: Applying the Constitution to U.S. Territories, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 779, 791 (1992).
29. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1460 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Duncan, 391
U.S. at 149–50 n.14).
30. Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
31. Id.
32. Confiscation is an appropriate limiting word because it retains this Article’s
central focus on the taking of land. The distinction is important because the Insular Cases
recognize that tax rates on personal property may be different in the Territories when
compared with the States. See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 293 (1901) (holding
that a tax on Puerto Rican produce, which exceeded mainland taxes, was acceptable even
while couched as a foreign import duty). Moreover, other cases have supported territorial
laws restricting property alienation due to the role of those laws in maintaining the initially
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Examining the original Insular Cases, the answer to this key question
seems to be yes. The constitutional protection of property against taking
for public use without just compensation is a fundamental right that should
apply across conditions in the different Territories. In Hawaii v. Mankichi,
counsel proposed the question of whether a local law in Hawaii
“confiscating private property for public use without compensation,
[would] remain in force after an annexation of the Territory to the United
States, which was conditioned upon the extinction of all legislation
contrary to the Constitution.33 The Court concluded that such a law would
not stand.34 Specifically, the Court explained, “[w]e would even go farther,
and say that most, if not all, the privileges and immunities contained in the
bill of rights of the Constitution were intended to apply from the moment
of annexation.”35 The reason that the Court rejected the application of the
Constitution in Mankichi, however, was because “the two rights alleged to
be violated in this case [were] not fundamental in their nature, but
concern[ed] merely a method of procedure.”36 Notably, the procedures at
issue were ones that the Court concluded, “sixty years of practice had
shown to be suited to the conditions of the islands, and well calculated to
conserve the rights of their citizens to their lives, their property[,] and their
well-being.”37 A subsequent Insular Case, Dorr v. United States, did not
speak directly to property rights but quoted in full this portion of the
Mankichi decision.38 Similarly, in Balzac v. Porto Rico, the Supreme Court
noted that, within the Territories, there were “guaranties of certain
fundamental personal rights declared in the Constitution.”39 In explaining
those rights, the Court specifically noted that “no person could be deprived
of life, liberty[,] or property without due process of law.”40

established compacts of governance. See Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462 (concluding that
restraints on land alienation in the Northern Mariana Islands were appropriate to protecting
the culture, and that maintaining the culture was a key part of the original agreement to
U.S. sovereignty, without which “the political union would not be possible”); Fitisemanu
v. United States, 1 F.4th 862, 866–67 (10th Cir. 2021) (addressing the question of
American citizenship for American Samoans, but reflecting that granting citizenship would
have a detrimental effect on the local system of land ownership, which includes an
alienation restriction).
33. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 217 (1903).
34. See id.
35. Id. at 217–18.
36. Id. at 218.
37. Id.
38. See Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 144–45 (1904) (quoting Mankichi, 190
U.S. at 218.).
39. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1922).
40. Id. at 313.
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B. Takings in Puerto Rico
The political document that first defined the U.S.-Puerto Rico
relationship as we know it today was the Foraker Act of 1900. The Foraker
Act was “a comprehensive measure designed to transform the economic,
legal[,] and political foundations of Puerto Rico.”41 By 1901, however, the
Hollander Bill created a colonial tax in Puerto Rico, which forced many
small-scale and poor farmers to sell their lands.42 In the words of historian
Cesar J. Ayala, the Hollander Bill was a “classical mechanism” of
colonization, effectively dispossessing rural populations to generate
unlanded labor forces for work on plantations.43 As a result, “the number
of landless people in Puerto Rico continued to increase . . . to a degree that
was exceptional in the Hispanic Caribbean at the time.”44
This effort to extract land from the local population cleared a path for
large sugar corporations to control massive plantations, on which the
newly unlanded population worked. These corporations included
American-owned sugar companies that “controlled 177,000 acres of the
island’s most fertile land – more than a quarter of the land suitable for
continuous cultivation.”45 The remaining land became concentrated in the
hands of large Puerto Rican companies known as latifundia.46 During this
period, the “sugar cane industry constituted nearly the entire economy of
Puerto Rico and was the Islands’ basic agricultural crop.”47 Ultimately,
this consolidation led to unrest on the island as “[t]he disastrous economic
downturn of the late 1920s intensified labor’s resolve to extract a measure
of economic justice from the sugar barons.”48
From the 1940s to the 1960s, eminent domain played a significant
role in reshaping the island politically and economically due to two
different sovereign actors: the local government and the federal
government. First, the local government began using eminent domain to
respond to the extensive control created by the economic and land
monopoly held by the sugar companies.49 Prior to the change of Puerto
Rico’s government in 1940, there was increasing public resentment of the
41. Pedro A. Cabán, Puerto Rico: State Formation in a Colonial Context, 30
CARIBBEAN STUD. 170, 176 (2002).
42. See César J. Ayala, The Decline of the Plantation Economy and the Puerto Rican
Migration of the 1950s, 7 LATINO STUD. J. 62, 66 (1996).
43. See id.
44. Id. at 67.
45. Keith S. Rosenn, Puerto Rican Land Reform: The History of An Instructive
Experiment, 73 YALE L. J. 334, 337 (1963).
46. See id.
47. Stuart P. Kastner, Constitutional Review of State Eminent Domain Legislation:
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 9 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 233, 238 (1985).
48. See Cabán, supra note 41, at 182.
49. See Matthew O. Edel, Land Reform in Puerto Rico, 1940–1959: Part One, 2
CARIBBEAN STUD. 26, 39 (1962).
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power that sugar companies held over the lives of their workers, as well as
a “widespread belief that” these companies “were exercising undue
political influence.”50 Coupled with rising concerns over foreign
companies controlling Puerto Rico, these factors led to the election of the
Popular Democratic Party (“PPD”) on the promise of land reform.51
In seeking to fulfill this promise, the new governing authority
established new land laws and a government “Land Authority.”52 Most
importantly, the Land Authority “could institute proceedings for the
expropriation of land held above 500 acres.”53 Such an ability was an
attempt to enforce a historic law that had been largely disregarded but still
limited the possession of land in Puerto Rico to 500 acres.54 The sugar
companies fought against these enforcement measures. However, in
Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Associates, the Puerto Rican government
ultimately prevailed on its authority to invoke eminent domain.55
With its eminent domain powers confirmed by the courts, the Land
Authority proceeded to acquire the landholdings of corporate plantations
over 500 acres and began to redistribute these lands to Puerto Ricans.56
This redistribution took three forms, in that land was disposed of either:
“(1) in small parcels to squatters and slum-dwellers for erection of homes,
(2) in parcels of five to twenty-five acres to individuals for subsistence
farming, [or] (3) in larger parcels to qualified persons for operating
‘proportional-profit’ farms.”57 By the mid-1950s, land reform fell by the
wayside as the Puerto Rican government focused on increasing efforts to
attract private industry. Puerto Rico’s new government sought to shift
away from a failing sugar industry, and “appropriations to the Land
Authority . . . were cut off entirely.”58
While the Land Authority sought to return land to local control, the
federal government continued displacing the local populations to enable a
military buildup.59 During this time, the U.S. military sought to expand,

50. Id. at 29.
51. See id. at 30–31 (“In the spring of 1940, the United States Supreme Court upheld
the 500 acre law, affirming the possibility of land reform in Puerto Rico, and opening the
door for the PPD to triumph on the land issue.”).
52. See id. at 37.
53. Id. at 39.
54. See id.
55. See Puerto Rico v. E. Sugar Assoc., 156 F.2d 316, 325 (1st Cir. 1946).
56. See Edel, supra note 49, at 44–45.
57. Case Comment, Eminent Domain. For What Purposes Property May Be Taken.
Condemnation of Corporate Land Holdings for Redistribution in Puerto Rican Agrarian
Reform Program Upheld, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1162, 1163 (1946).
58. Keith S. Rosenn, Puerto Rican Land Reform: The History of An Instructive
Experiment, 73 YALE L. J. 334, 349 (1963).
59. See Cesar Ayala Casas & Jose Bolivar Fresneda, The Cold War and Second
Expropriations of the Navy in Vieques, 28 CENTRO J. 10, 12–13 (2006).
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particularly on the islands of Vieques and Culebra.60 The expropriation of
Vieques was conducted in two phases (1941 and 1948), resulting in twothirds of the island falling under U.S. control and being used as a bombing
range.61 This expropriation drastically impacted the citizens of Vieques,
not only displacing them but effectively creating a “service economy”
dependent on “serving the troops.”62 This expropriation sparked protest
both from the local population and the Puerto Rican government, who
expressed that “the economy of Vieques was already in terrible shape and
. . . further takeover of land by the Navy would be disastrous to the
islanders.”63 In many ways, this prediction was accurate. The use of
eminent domain on Vieques led the island “in a direction opposite to that
of the rest of Puerto Rico, which underwent an economic and social
transformation.”64
Moreover, the process by which the federal government enforced its
eminent domain claims was viewed as particularly cruel. Many evictions
were “carried out literally overnight, with no compensation other than
minute house plots elsewhere in Vieques.”65 This process was only
possible because Vieques land, and consequently most of the actual
payment for expropriation, went directly to two landowners of sugar
latifundas who controlled the majority of the island.66 These
circumstances led to a situation where “large landowners received
economic compensation, but workers were simply expelled from the land
and their houses were demolished.”67
Many viewed the methods and scale of expropriation utilized on the
island as “part of a Navy plan to depopulate Vieques and turn the entire
island into a bombing range and maneuver area.”68 This view is supported
by evidence to some extent. The expropriated were “very much
encouraged to emigrate[,]” and in the twenty years following the eminent
domain claims, “the island lost [thirty] percent of its population.”69 Most
egregiously, perhaps, was a proposal dubbed Plan Dracula, which sought
to expel all living people from Vieques in addition to removing all bones
and coffins from the island “so that former residents had no reason to
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See id. at 13.
See id. at 12.
See id. at 11.
Id. at 15.
Juan A. Giusti-Cordero, War Politics and War Games in Puerto Rico, 88 NEW
W. INDIAN GUIDE 53, 58 (2014).
65. See id.
66. See J. Ayala César, From Sugar Plantations to Military Bases: the U.S. Navy’s
Expropriation in Vieques, Puerto Rico, 1940–45, 13 CENTRO J. 23, 26 (2001).
67. Id. at 37.
68. Giusti-Cordero, supra note 64, at 59.
69. Marie Cruz Soto, The Making of Viequenses: Militarized Colonialism and
Reproductive Rights, 19 MERIDIANS 360, 368–69 (2020).
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return, not even to pray or place flowers on the graves of their dead.”70
Ultimately, this plan did not materialize.
Beginning in the 1970s and continuing into the early 2000s, the U.S.
military faced severe public backlash against attempts for expansion
through eminent domain. This public pressure ultimately forced the U.S.
military to leave both Culebra and Vieques. In Culebra, this process began
in the early 1970s when the territorial government, in support of local
protests, held the position that the Navy “should terminate all training
operations on Culebra . . . within a reasonable period.”71 This position
immediately followed an attempt by the U.S. Navy in 1970 to “forcibly
remove the entire population of Culebra.”72 In 1971, an agreement known
as the Culebra agreement was signed in which the Navy agreed that they
would seek an alternative island to conduct training operations on.73
Subsequently, the Navy proceeded to backtrack on this agreement until
1974, when President Nixon ordered the Navy’s withdrawal.74
Conversely, the demilitarization of Vieques began after a military
accident which resulted in the death of a native citizen of Vieques, David
Sanes-Rodriguez.75 The outrage resulting from this event ultimately led to
mass protests that spread beyond Vieques and “encourage[d] the largest
public demonstration[] ever in Puerto Rico.”76
Today, the legacy of military occupation and the associated acts of
eminent domain continue. The Navy occupation of Vieques did not end
with a complete transfer of land to the government of Puerto Rico. Instead,
much of this land was shifted to the Department of the Interior for use as
a nature conservancy.77 While this is admirable, there are at least seventeen
toxic sites within these areas—including five dumps in which “[n]o
modern environmental safeguards, such as clay linings, were ever used
. . . .”78 After twenty years without the Navy’s presence, eight of these
seventeen sites “are still under review, and no significant action has been
taken with regard to any of the nine others.”79 Even without the Navy
70. Frances Negron-Muntaner, The Emptying Island: Puerto Rican Expulsion in
Post-Maria Time, HEMISPHERIC INST., https://bit.ly/3u2q5UR (last visited July 31, 2021).
71. Id.
72. Nathalie Schils, Puerto Ricans Expel United States Navy from Culebra Island,
1970–1974, GLOB. NONVIOLENT ACTION DATABASE (June 7, 2011), https://bit.ly/3KLrFk1.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. See Javier Arbona, Vieques, Puerto Rico: From Devastation to Conservation and
Back Again, 17 TRAD. DWELL. & SETTLE. REV. 33, 34 (2005) (“On April 19, 1999, an F-18
fighter jet dropped two 500-pound bombs several miles off target and killed Vieques-born
David Sanes-Rodríguez[.]”).
76. See id. at 35.
77. See id. at 36 (“On May 1, 2003, the day after the Navy left, the U.S. Department
of the Interior inherited most of these lands.”).
78. Id. at 40.
79. Id.
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directly impacting the lives of the Viequenses, the very substrate of the
island has been permanently affected by the federal government’s eminent
domain claims in the 1940s.
The modern views and usage of eminent domain reflect the historic
trend of deciding whether development for Puerto Rico is best served
through locally-led development or foreign investment. Hurricane Maria
has only exacerbated the divide between these two schools of thought in
many ways. For those favoring foreign investment, primarily championed
by the government, eminent domain has been viewed as necessary to
create attractive spaces for foreign investment. The Puerto Rican
government has combined this view with policies driving such foreign
investment. For example, in the early 2010s, Puerto Rico passed tax laws
allowing Americans who spend half of the year on the island to pay zero
tax on U.S. income.80 The impact of these policies is most apparent in
neighborhoods such as Vietnam, where poor and disadvantaged
communities have been subject to eminent domain claims for the purposes
of building tourism and luxury developments, such as a hotel and casino.81
As Clarisa Moreno, a Vietnam resident, stated, “We have lived in our
homes for generations, but they are going to be destroyed to make way for
rich people coming to our island.”82
Yet many Puerto Ricans, especially those in low-income, historically
disadvantaged communities, have sought to fight against such eminent
domain claims, sometimes through novel legal strategies. A significant
example of this occurred in the community of Caño Martin Peńa.83 Here,
the community created a land trust which “gives more than 2,000 people
collective legal rights over 200 acres of land on which their houses are
built.”84 However, these legal rights were not easily achieved. In 2009, the
Puerto Rican legislature sought to reverse the legal clause that permitted
the establishment of the trust and prevailed in federal court.85 It was only
through mass protest that the 2009 act was repealed, and the land trust was
permitted once again. Importantly, achieving such legal rights is essential
in communities where land titles are largely not formally in place. The
scale of this problem, which has legacies not only from the Hollander Act
of 1901 but the PPD land redistribution in the 1940s, is massive, with a
80. See Rupert Neate, Puerto Rico Woos US Investors with Huge Tax Break As Locals
Fund Debt Crisis, GUARDIAN (Feb. 14, 2016, 8:38 AM EST), https://bit.ly/33Ijkg8.
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. See Marlena Hartz, Why Hurricane Maria Is No Match for This Mighty
Community in Puerto Rico, FORBES (Mar. 19, 2018, 8:33 AM EDT), https://bit.ly/3IvlApP.
84. Id.
85. See id. (explaining that “[i]n 2009, the Puerto Rico Legislature reversed the legal
clause that established the Caño land trust,” and a U.S. Court of Appeals “judge upheld the
legislature’s reversal”).
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supposed “585,000 – 715,000 (45 – 55 percent) of homes and commercial
buildings in Puerto Rico hav[ing] been constructed without building
permits . . . .”86
This indispensable fact has been instrumental in shaping the response
to Hurricane Maria, as Federal Emergency Management Agency
(“FEMA”) guidelines that are incompatible with this reality have
hampered recovery efforts. Access to loan funds via FEMA’s Individuals
and Households program requires proper title of the property to be
established; as a result, many Puerto Ricans lack access to emergency
federal funds.87 The scale of this problem is massive, with “nearly half of
all residents, according to studies, lack[ing] the clear titles to their
properties that would allow them to take out housing reconstruction
loans.”88 While there are efforts to ameliorate this situation, with proposals
by Puerto Rico to implement a program to provide title documents to
individuals, a continued fear remains amongst advocates that the risks of
expropriation remain high for these informal communities.89
This continued fear has ultimately led both local and national activists
to raise concerns about the threat of eminent domain in Puerto Rico. In
2018, following Hurricane Maria, the Institute for Justice released a report
on Expropriation in Puerto Rico and offered a scathing analysis.90 Of
particular concern was Act No. 83, which “states that private property can
be expropriated for ‘any other useful purpose declared so by the Municipal
Legislature.’”91 This fear has been realized after “the damage and
destruction left by Maria further worsened the situation, as many mayors
and municipalities have used the need to recover and rebuild as a pretext
for new economic development projects.”92

86. Ivis Garcia, The Lack of Proof of Ownership in Puerto Rico Is Crippling Repairs
in the Aftermath of Hurricane Maria, HUM. RTS. MAG., May 21, 2021, at 20, 21.
87. See id. (“FEMA’s adherence to strict homeownership regulations precludes
individuals living in these homes from gaining access to federal aid.”).
88. Michael Kimmelman, Rebuilding a Puerto Rico Barrio: ‘Dead Is the Only Way
They’ll Ever Get Me to Leave,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2019), https://nyti.ms/33V6ZWc.
89. See Nicole Acevado, Housing Is Key to Puerto Rico’s Recovery. Will 2019 See
Promised Funding, Solutions?, NBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2019, 4:53 AM EST),
https://nbcnews.to/3g8BScc (“Advocates have also raised concerns over expropriation
risks that could disproportionately fuel displacement among residents of informal
communities, even if property titles are granted to them.”).
90. See generally INST. FOR JUST., EXPROPRIATION IN PUERTO RICO: POLICY BRIEF
AND REPORT CARD (2018), https://bit.ly/3ujLPMe (examining the history of eminent
domain in Puerto Rico in the post-Kelo era in which Puerto Rico continued to allow
eminent domain as a development tool).
91. Id. at 5.
92. Id. at 6.
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C. Takings in Guam
1. Guam and the U.S. Government
The history of land confiscation in Guam is a military story.93
Historian Stephen Kinzer described that there was no other explanation
that made any sense in terms of the American occupation: “Guam had only
about 10,000 inhabitants in 1898, hardly enough to constitute a market for
American goods. It offered little in the way of resources or investment
opportunities. Its appeal was simple: location.”94
Of course, location is a kind of appeal that never changes. At the point
of initial colonization, Kinzer explained this appeal as such: “Guam lies
between Hawaii and the Philippines, and is within [a] reasonable range of
Shanghai, Hong Kong, and other ports on the East Asian mainland. Any
nation seeking to project power into that region would find it a fine
prize.”95 In modern geopolitics, Guam remains “a crucial geopolitical
nexus in East Asia,”96 primarily because it is the closest U.S. land to both
China and North Korea.97
In pursuit of militarization, the U.S. military claimed land on the
island to establish necessary ports, bases, and airfields.98 The U.S. Military
owns approximately 27% of land in Guam99 and has controlled as much
as 36%.100 Much of this land has been acquired in a way that does not sit
neatly with American public notions of a constitutional taking because just
compensation did not regularly occur. A resolution of the Guam
Legislature, summarizing the history of takings, found that such takings

93. See generally ROBERT F. ROGERS, DESTINY’S LANDFALL: A HISTORY OF GUAM
108–26 (1995) (setting out the history of conquest, occupation, and colonization of Guam).
In terms of the U.S. occupation, the initial rule of Guam was entirely military based, with
an officer holding the dual titles of commander of the naval station and governor of the
island. See Stephen Kinzer, Cruel Realities: The American Conquest of Guam, 23 WORLD
POL’Y J. 100, 102 (2006) (“President McKinley decreed that the entire island would be
considered a naval station, ruled by an officer with absolute power.”).
94. Kinzer, supra note 93, at 100.
95. Id.
96. Jessica Dweck, Why Are We in Guam?, SLATE (Mar. 23, 2010, 5:33 PM),
https://bit.ly/3AGL9kW.
97. See Blaine Harden, On Guam, Planned Marine Base Raises Anger, Infrastructure
Concerns, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2010), https://wapo.st/3g63crm.
98. See id.
99. See id.; see also Guam Res. No. 285-30 (COR), 30th Leg., 1st Sess. (2009)
(enacted) (“[T]he Department of Defense currently possesses forty thousand (40,000)
acres, constituting 27.21 percent of the island’s land mass.”).
100. See Guam Res. No. 285-30 (COR), 30th Leg., 1st Sess. (2009) (enacted) (“This
left the Navy and Air Force in direct control of about forty-nine thousand six hundred
(49,600) acres, or over thirty-six percent (36%) of the island.”).
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were overwhelmingly either uncompensated or inadequately
compensated.101
U.S. military control of land in Guam began before World War II,
when occupying U.S. forces controlled more than one-third of the
island.102 There has since been a long history of belated and minimal
attempts at redress.103 In terms of property, the attempt at post-hoc legality
began in 1945 with the Guam Meritorious Claims Act.104 The Act provided
for the settlement of property claims through the Secretary of the Navy,
who had the power to adjudicate and settle claims, and set the statute of
limitations on claims at one year.105 Additionally, the military’s authority
to grant claims was quite limited because claims over $5,000 had to be
sent directly to Congress.106
The process provided for by the Guam Meritorious Claims Act did
not proceed satisfactorily for a variety of reasons, including both the short
statute of limitations and the referral of claims over $5,000 to Congress.
By 1947, United States Navy Secretary James Forrestal appointed a
civilian commission, the Hopkins Commission, to study this problem,
101. See id. (summarizing the history of takings in which just compensation was not
given and explaining that in some cases when compensation was given, such compensation
“was inadequate, due in part to a lack of proper land valuation . . . amounting to only
pennies on the dollar for the actual value of the land”).
102. See id.
103. Another act of takings by the U.S. government in Guam involved the
government’s cancellation of the reparations claims of residents of Guam from World War
II. The 1951 peace treaty between Japan and the U.S. forgave Japan for any responsibility
to pay reparations to residents of Guam for the atrocities that took place during the Japanese
occupation (including forced labor, internment, rape, injury, and death). Residents of Guam
later found that the “treaty effectively prevented Guam from suing Japan for damages.”
Anita Hofschneider, Guam Residents Compensated for War Atrocities Decades Later,
ABC NEWS (Feb. 27, 2020), https://abcn.ws/3o6CZgz. Payments of $10,000–$25,000 were
authorized in 2016. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L.
No. 114-328, § 1704, 130 Stat. 2000, 2644 (2016). The process for authorizing these
payments had taken decades of work, including another fifteen years after hearings were
held in the U.S. Senate in 2001. See, e.g., Guam War Claims Review Commission; And
Guam Income Tax: Hearing on H.R. 308 and H.R. 309 Before the S. Comm. on Energy &
Nat. Res., 107th Cong. 1 (2001). This was only a small part of what had been a decadeslong fight to gain some compensation from the U.S. government.
Most of those reparations claims come from the Chamorro people, the indigenous
population of Guam. But in a way, this compensation does not come from the U.S. at all.
“The claims are to be funded with so-called Section 30 money, federal taxes that are already
remitted to Guam and typically added to its general fund. The program is a compromise
after decades of failed attempts to get more expansive compensation supported by both
Congress and the people of Guam.” Hofschneider, supra note 103.
104. See DON YOUNG, GUAM WAR CLAIMS REVIEW COMMISSION ACT, H.R. REP. NO.
106-815, at 2 (2000) (“On November 15, 1945, the Guam Meritorious Claims Act (Public
Law 79-224) authorized the Secretary of the Navy to adjudicate and settle claims . . . for
property damage occurring on Guam during the occupation of Japanese forces.”).
105. See id.
106. See id. (“Certification of claims in excess of $5,000 or any claims for personal
injury or death were to be forwarded to Congress.”).
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among others.107 The Hopkins Commission Report described the claims
process as proceeding “slowly” and advised “that immediate steps should
be taken to hasten this process and to remove unsound and unfair
distinctions in the allowance for claims.”108 The report concluded that the
referral to Congress delayed claims,109 meaning that desperate landowners
“offered or agreed to reduce their claim to below $5,000 and accept the
loss above that amount, in order to receive money for much-needed
personal rehabilitation.”110 Eventually, in 1981, former landowners
brought a class action suit against the U.S. regarding the post-World War
II condemnations, which was ultimately settled.111
Meanwhile, as claims for uncompensated takings continued, the
Navy Department expanded its land ownership in Guam and, from the
perspective of the Guam Legislature, continued the trend of
unconstitutional takings. “[C]ompensation was inadequate, due in part to
a lack of proper valuation in the largely agrarian island, amounting to only
pennies on the dollar for the actual value of the land.”112 Between 1947
and 1950, additional “large pieces of land were taken” for military
facilities.113 Finally, just before the Organic Act went into effect in 1950—
making the local indigenous population American citizens—“without
consultation with Guam officials or owners of [twenty-two] leased
properties, the new civilian Governor, Carlton Skinner, signed a quitclaim
deed . . . whereby the Government of Guam transferred all condemned
property to the United States of America ‘for its own use.’”114 After this
transfer, the U.S. military had “direct control of about forty-nine thousand
six hundred (49,600) acres, or over thirty-six percent (36%) of the
island.”115
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. Notably, the report concluded that the referral of claims to Congress was a
needless safeguard. “The Report also stated that officials of the Naval Claims Commission
testified to the basic honesty and fairness of the Guamanians in presenting their claims,
that review in Washington of claims between $5,000 and $10,000 did not seem to serve
any useful purpose, and that sufficient reliance and trust should be placed with the Naval
authorities in Guam to safeguard the national interest.” H.R. REP. NO. 106-815, at 2 (2000).
110. Id.
111. See In re Guam Land Cases, No. 88-15615, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17739, at
*1 (9th Cir. July 23, 1992) (discussing the history of the class action).
112. See Guam Res. No. 285-30 (COR), 30th Leg., 1st Sess., at 4 (2009) (enacted).
113. See id. at 5.
114. See id. at 5–6.
115. See Guam Res. No. 285-30 (COR), 30th Leg., 1st Sess., at 6 (2009) (enacted).
In the 1990s, when the military was declaring some land as unneeded or “excess,” rather
than returning land to Guam or to the original owners of the land, the military transferred
land to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service without advance notice. Id. at 6–7. Subsequent
to the outcry over this incident, the military directly returned some small parcels to the
original owners or their families. See Guam Families Weep as Military Returns Land, PAC.
DAILY NEWS (May 21, 2003) (on file with author).
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In the twenty-first century, Guam faces yet another military buildup
and the associated threat to local land ownership116—primarily as a
response to deepening concerns over U.S.-China relations.117 As of 2006,
the U.S. military announced plans for a substantial buildup in Guam and
began preparing the necessary documents required of a federal agency for
major federal action.118
In 2010, the Legislature of Guam passed a resolution opposing the
further U.S. control of island lands.119 The resolution concluded that, “it
appears that the federal government has no appreciation for the history of
[f]ederal land takings in Guam, or the importance of land to the people of
Guam.”120 The resolution further explained, “the history of land takings
and the importance of land in the local culture of a tiny island have resulted
in a significant sensitivity to [f]ederal land takings on the part of the local
people.”121
A former resident of Guam, Koohan Paik, wrote about the changes
happening as of 2010:
I returned to Guam for a month-long visit with old friends this past
November. I was stunned to find the forests of my childhood being
replaced by tarmac at an alarming rate; the remaining wild beaches and
valleys being surveyed as potential live-fire shooting ranges; and an
enormous, magnificently rich coral reef slated for dredging in order to
build a port for the Navy’s largest aircraft carrier.122

Mr. Paik continued,
I witnessed the rage and hurt, exploding suddenly--and so
unexpectedly--from the Chamorro people and other island residents,
who have had no say in the planning of cataclysmic changes that will
116. Notably, in the 1990s, with the closure of bases across the U.S., Guam residents
hoped for the return of federal lands and created a mechanism for doing so equitably—the
Guam Ancestral Lands Commission. See 21 GUAM CODE ANN. § 80103 (2020). A very
small amount of land may be returned in the current climate of military buildup. See
Anumita Kaur, Navy Identifies 210 Acres of Excess Federal Land to Return to Govguam,
PAC. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 1, 2021), https://bit.ly/3obM4Vw.
117. See Mar-Vic Cagurangan & Alex Rhowuniong, Operational Buildup: Guam Is
at the Center of US Military’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Amid Beijing’s, PAC. ISLAND TIMES
(Aug. 8, 2020), https://bit.ly/35CXeMJ (“The U.S. military is accelerating its operational
tempo in the Indo-Pacific region — with Guam as its showcase — to send a signal for
deterrence amid China’s growing aggression in its peripheries.”).
118. See Tiara R. Na’puti & Michael Lujan Bevacqua, Militarization and Resistance
from Guåhan: Protecting and Defending Pågat, 67 AMERICAN Q. 837, 845 (2015); see also
Tinian Women Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 976 F.3d 832, 835–36 (9th Cir. 2020)
(explaining the timeline of preparations for troop relocation to Guam from 2007–2010).
119. See Guam Res. No. 285-30 (COR), 30th Leg., 1st Sess., at 3 (2009) (enacted).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Koohan Paik, Living at the ‘Tip of the Spear,’ NATION (Apr. 15, 2010),
https://bit.ly/3ATGMTN.
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turn their homeland into an overcrowded waste dump for the creation
of the hemisphere’s pre-eminent military fortress. My friends told me
it’s all part of what’s called the Guam Buildup.123

Such massive military enterprises also create collateral damage—the
kind of damage that can impact both property values and residents’
everyday lives. One of the primary concerns on the tiny island is that “the
construction of a new Marine Corps base will overwhelm the island’s
already inadequate water and sewage systems, as well as its port, power
grid, hospital, highways[,] and social services.”124 Even the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) challenged the military regarding these plans,
which could overwhelm the water and sewer systems of the island.125
Potential water shortages in Guam would “fall disproportionately on a low
income medically underserved population.”126 The Government
Accountability Office agreed with the EPA, finding that the proposed
military buildup would “substantially” burden infrastructure generally.127
To understand the infrastructure burden another way, consider the
population of the tiny island, which was trying to figure out whether it had
“the carrying capacity to absorb a [fifty] percent population surge.”128
By September 2017, Governor of Guam, Eddie Calvo, asked for
military construction to stop, citing the unavailability of labor for Guam
businesses.129 Local businesses were forced to file suit due to a labor
shortage, and Calvo concluded that he could “no longer . . . support the
military buildup as a result.”130
The issue of military buildup remains a live one. As of late 2020, the
U.S. Navy planned to relocate approximately 5,000 troops to Guam.131 The
location of the tiny island continues to be the paramount motivation as
Guam remains “the tip of the U.S. military’s spear” and thus the “enemy’s
default target.”132 “The Indo-Pacific remains the most consequential
region in the world[,] and it is the priority theater for the U.S. Department
123. Id.
124. See Harden, supra note 97.
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. Paik, supra note 122.
129. See John I. Borja, Gov. Calvo to U.S.: Stop and Re-Evaluate Military Buildup,
PAC. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 29, 2017), https://bit.ly/3IRXbuD.
130. Id.
131. See Kevin Knodell, Japan is Paying for New U.S. Military Facilities in Guam
and the CNMI. Here’s Why, HONOLULU CIVIL BEAT (Nov. 1, 2020), https://bit.ly/3IPTWE7
(summarizing the Defense Policy Review Initiative, “an agreement that would relocate
thousands of U.S. Marines from Japan and spread them to bases across the Pacific”).
132. See Cagurangan & Rhowuniong, supra note 117; see also Mike Cohen, Guam:
Where The Next War Begins?, PAC. ISLAND TIMES (Aug. 1, 2020), https://bit.ly/3g8RPz3
(arguing that if conflict between China and the U.S. is not resolved, it will lead to hostilities
first known and felt by “Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands”).
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of Defense,” according to General Charles Q. Brown Jr., commander of
the Pacific Air Forces.133
In theory, and in response to local outrage against federal land
control, the U.S. military has now adopted a “net negative strategy” for
Guam. This strategy essentially means that “in line with their buildup
plans, the military is required to make efficient use of land already owned
by the Department of Defense.”134
However, it is difficult to take the U.S. military’s “net negative”
commitment seriously in some ways. Such hesitancy is particularly true in
light of the establishment and significant expansion of the Pacific Remote
Islands Marine National Monument. By January 6, 2009, President George
W. Bush established the Pacific Remote Islands Marine National
Monument under the authority of the Antiquities Act of 1906,135 which
designated almost 87,000 square miles of islands and marine environments
as preserved.136 Accordingly, it is not surprising that the Guam legislature
issued its scathing resolution on the U.S. government and land takings
after the announcement of the National Monument. The resolution
demanded that the U.S. government deal “in good faith with the official
representatives of the people of Guam”137 and “declar[ed] that
condemnation SHALL NOT be a tool available to the federal government,
either directly or through the use of intimidation.”138 Importantly, the
legislature chose this moment to “recognize and memorialize the many
years of injustice and mistreatment of the people of Guam, as reflected in
the foregoing history of [f]ederal land takings.”139 One reason for the peak
of outrage at this moment was the Monument’s centralization of federal
control. In short, the Monument “limits access to traditional fishing
grounds, [and] removes original landowners[.]”140 Theoretically, the
Monument’s presidential proclamation acknowledges that it is “subject to
valid existing rights,” but it also gives “[w]arning . . . to all unauthorized
persons not to appropriate, excavate, injure, destroy, or remove any feature
of this Monument Expansion and not to locate or settle upon any lands
thereof.”141 In light of those warnings, it seems unclear whether the federal
government would respect traditional fishing rights or other ownership
claims.
133. Cagurangan & Rhowuniong, supra note 117.
134. Mary Camacho Torres, Advocate for Deliberate Land Strategies and
Procedures, GUAM DAILY POST (Feb. 18, 2016), https://bit.ly/3IPUFFl.
135. See Proclamation No. 8336, 3 C.F.R. § 100.8 (2010).
136. See id.
137. Guam Res. No. 285-30 (COR), 30th Leg., 1st Sess., at 8 (2009) (enacted).
138. Id. at 8–9.
139. Id. at 9.
140. Na’puti & Bevacqua, supra note 118, at 837.
141. Proclamation No. 9173, 3 C.F.R. § 100.115 (2015).
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Moreover, in 2014, President Barack Obama expanded the Pacific
Remote Islands Marine National Monument,142 creating the largest marine
reserve in the world.143 The new bounds are approximately 495,000 square
miles.144
Notably, both the establishment and expansion of the Monument took
place precisely at the moment that the U.S. was pursuing a new military
buildup in Guam. While the Monument might, on its face, appear to be
entirely a conservation measure, a closer reading of the documents calls
these motives into question. Although both presidential proclamations
speak to the extraordinary marine ecosystems in the region, both also leave
ample room for military activities. The proclamations note that “[t]he
prohibitions required . . . shall not apply to activities and exercises of the
Armed Forces[.]”145 As a result of both the timing of the Monument’s
establishment and the significant room for military activities within the
preserve, it is difficult to view the Monument as not being a part of the
larger federal plan for military buildup within the region. The Monument
simply has conservation bonuses that make it more publicly palatable.
With little recourse on the establishment of the Monument, the
current emphasis in Guam is on asking Congress and the military to
designate lands as “excess” and to return those lands either to the
government of Guam or directly to the original owners and/or their
families. In 2011, the Guam Economic Development Authority created a
survey of lands, identifying “potentially releasable federal land.”146 In
June 2017, the Navy released a report on “Net Negative” status within
Guam, noting that the Navy specifically still owns more than 36,000 acres
of land.147 Under the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, the Navy
must continue to inventory its lands within Guam and label unused and
unneeded land as “excess” land, which may be returned to the territorial
government.148 In June 2019, the Guam Economic Development Authority
updated its survey, suggesting another contingent of land that might be
designated as “excess.”149 However, this entire process depends on the
Navy designating land as unnecessary while it is simultaneously
142. See id.
143. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., PACIFIC REMOTE ISLANDS MARINE NATIONAL
MONUMENT—ABOUT THE MONUMENT (2019), https://bit.ly/3obOTpP.
144. See U.S. DEP’T OF COM., PACIFIC REMOTE ISLANDS MARINE NATIONAL
MONUMENT (2020), https://bit.ly/3rcpoGv.
145. Proclamation No. 8336, 3 C.F.R. § 100.8 (2010); Proclamation No. 9173, 3
C.F.R. § 100.115 (2015).
146. GUAM ECON. DEV. AUTH., REPORT, POTENTIALLY RELEASABLE FEDERAL LANDS
2 (2019), https://bit.ly/32JysJC.
147. See id.
148. See Guam Omnibus Opportunities Act, 40 U.S.C. § 521 (2002) (authorizing the
return of land to the Government of Guam).
149. See GUAM ECON. DEV. AUTH., supra note 146.
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challenged with absorbing thousands of troops from other Asian-Pacific
locations.
2. Fighting Indigenous Land Control
In addition to the general history of takings, the U.S. has also
specifically impeded Guam’s attempt to reposition land in the hands of
members of the indigenous community in recent years. Guam established
the Chamorro Land Trust, which holds public lands in trust for the benefit
of the Chamorros, the local indigenous peoples, who may apply for longterm leases (both residential and agricultural).150 The land trust is operated
locally via a commission with five members appointed by the Governor of
Guam and confirmed by the local legislature.151 The trust was designed to
benefit those who are “native Chamorro,” which was defined as “any
person who the Commission determines to be of at least one-fourth part of
the blood of any person who inhabited the island prior to 1898.”152
In September 2017, the United States filed a federal action alleging
that the land trust violated Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968
because it discriminated against non-Chamorros.153 This filing was rather
ironic given that the land trust was directly responsive to the history of
U.S. government actions concerning land and the indigenous people in
Guam.154
The district court found that the facts were generally undisputed.
“During and after World War II, the United States seized land on Guam,
mostly from Guam’s native inhabitants, the Chamorro people . . . [and]
provided little or no compensation[.]”155 Additionally, the issue was
difficult to address as the U.S. ensured that “documentation underlying
these seizures was sparse or nonexistent.”156 A portion of the seized land
was returned to Guam in 1952, and the Chamorro Land Trust Act was

150. See Chamorro Land Trust Act, 21 GUAM CODE ANN., ch. 75 (2021).
151. See 21 GUAM CODE ANN. § 75102(a) (2021) (establishing the composition,
chairman, and compensation for the Chamorro Land Trust).
152. Guam Pub. L. No. 12-226 (1975).
153. See United States v. Gov’t of Guam, No. 17-00113, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
215308, at *2 (D. Guam Dec. 21, 2018) (“[T]he United States seeks to stop Guam from
continuing what the United States describes as racial discrimination through the
implementation of the Chamorro Land Trust Act.”).
154. See id. (explaining that the U.S. government maintained that it was not clear that
the commission’s beneficiaries were the individuals whose land had been confiscated
without compensation and whether the commission was actually benefiting those
individuals).
155. Id. at *2–3.
156. See id. at *3.
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designed to benefit the Chamorro people who had previously been
deprived of their lands.157
Notably, the U.S. initially sought to obtain not only a change in policy
but also money damages from the defendants (Guam and the Chamorro
Land Trust).158 The suit was settled at the end of May 2020, with Guam
agreeing to change the relevant rules and regulations and promising not to
“discriminate” based on “race or national origin” in future leases.159
Subsequently, the U.S. sought to vacate the court’s previous orders finding
that it could not pursue money damages.160 The ultimate settlement—a
direct result of the federal government’s actions—means that the
Chamorro Land Trust can no longer specifically benefit the Chamorro
people.161
3. Local Uncompensated Takings
Lacking a sense of federal constitutional standards, the local
government of Guam emulated the federal disregard for land rights for
decades. Thus, post-1945, there is a long history of takings of property by
the local government of Guam without any compensation. The Guam
Legislature has recently recognized this problematic history in a public
law condemning the practice of taking without compensation:
[S]ince 1945, it has also been the practice of the government to take
private property without any compensation or compensatory exchange
when that land has been needed for such purposes as public roads,
access to property, or easements for public utilities, the construction of
public schools, the construction of water wells, and similar projects
benefitting the public at large. This practice must cease immediately
because it is contrary to the principles of eminent domain, justice, and
constitutional guarantees of property rights.162

This public law responded to an audit by the Inspector General,
Department of the Interior that found approximately 73.3 million dollars

157. See id. (“[T]he language returning that land expressly recognized that Guam’s
inhabitants had had land taken from them and were entitled to consideration of their
needs.”).
158. See id. at *2 (holding that relief was limited to declaratory and injunctive
remedies and refusing money damages as an available remedy).
159. See United States v. Gov’t of Guam, Civil No. 17-cv-00113, Settlement
Agreement, at 4 (2020), https://bit.ly/3sapA8C.
160. See United States v. Guam, No. 17-00113, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126553, at
*1–2 (D. Guam July 17, 2020) (denying the motion to vacate and retaining the holding that
the U.S. cannot pursue money damages).
161. See Steve Limtiaco, Land Trust Discrimination Settlement Hinges on Action by
Guam Lawmakers, PAC. DAILY NEWS (June 5, 2020), https://bit.ly/3ukBi34 (explaining the
settlement agreement).
162. Guam Pub. L. 22-73 (1994).
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“in excess costs to properly acquire title to the rights-of-way which have
been taken by the various departments of government.”163 The public law
recognizes the Audit Report’s finding that “property owners were not
compensated for 375,000 square meters of land taken over forty years ago,
for 12,603 square meters taken since 1988, and for 28,705 square meters
taken on a temporary basis.”164 Notably, these findings do not represent
the total amount of uncompensated land because “[t]hese figures only
represent land taken for various road projects and do not include land taken
for easements not affected by the road construction.”165 The Guam public
law noted that there was either “no compensation or grossly inadequate
compensation . . . given, either in terms of money or by land
exchanges.”166 Notably, the Governor of Guam vetoed the act, which later
passed by an over-ride.167 The bill was a response to what Senator Mary
Camacho Torres described as takings “without the proper exercise of
eminent domain or negotiated transfer.”168 Unfortunately, such errors
compounded because landowners remained unaware that their rights were
extinguished and often did not understand these rights until statutes of
limitations expired.169
D. Takings in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (“CNMI”) has
historically had significant issues with unjust takings of land. These issues
parallel the history in Guam, creating a striking pattern of federal and local
confiscations.
1. The Northern Mariana Islands and the U.S. Military Takings
The relationship between the local government of CNMI and the
federal government revolves around the usage of lands within the Territory
for military purposes. The decision of what lands the military would
occupy was central to the 1973 negotiations that culminated in the
formation of the CNMI through a covenant.170 During these negotiations,
163. See id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. Additionally, in 2015 a suit alleged that the government of Guam “illegally
collected real-property taxes from landowners whose property had been acquired for public
use,” which, if true, seems nothing more than adding insult to injury. See Shawn
Raymundo, Lawsuit Alleges Property Wrongly Taxed, PAC. DAILY NEWS (June 15, 2015),
https://bit.ly/33MsNmu.
167. See Guam Pub. L. 22-134 (1994).
168. Mary Camacho Torres, Advocate for Deliberate Land Strategies and
Procedures, GUAM DAILY POST (Feb. 18, 2016), https://bit.ly/3fQmH7e.
169. See id.
170. See Arnold H. Liebowitz, The Marianas Covenant Negotiations, 4 FORDHAM
INT’L L. J. 19, 19 n.3 (1980).
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mass tracts of land were leased to the federal government for use as
military bases and target practice areas.171 Other areas were set aside for
future military developments.172
The Covenant Establishing the Commonwealth offered some
protections for the Territory against aggressive expansion of the lands in
the future, providing that the U.S. must seek to “acquire the minimum area
and minimum interest necessary to achieve the purpose for which property
is sought and attempt to acquire property by voluntary means before
exercising eminent domain.”173 Nevertheless, this requirement has largely
failed to be honored in good faith. Instead, this requirement has resulted
in a system in which the territorial government has largely conceded that
avoiding eminent domain claims from the federal government through
proactively leasing the land to them is the most prudent and beneficial path
for the Territory.174
Tensions escalated, however, with the Pacific-Asian buildup of the
twenty-first century. In 2014, the U.S. Navy proposed to take complete
control of the island of Pagan. Pagan is currently unoccupied following a
volcanic eruption that forced its residents to relocate. Still, previous
residents have expressed a desire to reclaim their land.175 The U.S. Navy
sees Pagan as “big enough and isolated enough to train amphibious forces
at a necessary scale.”176
The Pagan plan provoked significant public frustration within the
islands. By 2015, residents had mobilized a legislative effort to pass a bill
prohibiting the CNMI’s Department for Public Lands from entering leases
with the U.S. military.177 This effort ultimately stalled after the Attorney
General of CNMI, Edward Manibusan, made it clear that there was no
legislative authority to prohibit certain land uses by the U.S. military and
that the bill “[could] not prevent the U.S. from taking the land it desires
through eminent domain, which could be a far worse outcome for the
Commonwealth than if the land were leased.”178

171. See id.
172. See id.
173. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF
THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON 902 CONSULTATIONS 28
(Jan. 2017) [hereinafter SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES].
174. See Joel D. Pinaroc, AG: Military Can Still Acquire Lands Using Eminent
Domain, SAIPAN TRIBUNE (June 11, 2015), https://bit.ly/3giUHcM.
175. See Steve Limtiaco, Here’s Why Pagan Homestead Applicants Are Having
Trouble Getting Permits to Live on Island, PAC. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 11, 2019),
https://bit.ly/3IQAPcU.
176. Grant Newsham, Mariana Islands – US Military Strategy ‘On Hold’, ASIA PAC.
BULL. (Mar. 26, 2018), https://bit.ly/3sGmwS5.
177. See Joel D. Pinaroc, AG: Military Can Still Acquire Lands Using Eminent
Domain, SAIPAN TRIBUNE (June 11, 2015), https://bit.ly/3giUHcM.
178. Id.
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Subsequently, residents sought 902 consultations, a process by which
members of the CNMI government engage with representatives of the
federal government to ameliorate disputes and generally reaffirm the
territorial relationship.179 This process concluded in 2017, focusing
specifically on the U.S. military and Pagan. During these negotiations,
CNMI explicitly clarified their view of the action that “such a proposal is
not respectful of the scarcity and special importance of land in the
Northern Mariana Islands.”180
This issue is still developing as the U.S. military continues to
envision a future on Pagan. Yet, the situation is iconic in that it
demonstrates the land takings pattern in CNMI for the federal government:
the threat of eminent domain manifests, and residents move towards
appeasement, viewing eminent domain as a more dangerous proposition.
But following a prolonged legal battle, a perception still exists both within
the military and Territory that the plan will reach fruition in the future.181
As of April 2019, Navy officials “requested that the Federal Aviation
Administration restrict airspace over Tinian because ‘[t]he commercial
airport on Tinian is within three nautical miles of the military lease area
where the live-fire range complex will be sited and restricted airspace
placed above it.’”182 In 2020, members of the territorial legislature made
clear that “the Department of Defense has not taken the CNMI Joint
Military Training proposal off the table, although the CNMI government
and the community have expressed their objection.”183 Despite these
objections, there have been repeated assurances by the Governor of CNMI,
Ralph Torres, that the United States Department of Defense (DOD) and
the Territory have “never had a better relationship.”184
In terms of the specifics of the military plans, the Ninth Circuit
rejected the proposed usage of Pagan as the site of massive live-fire war
179. See SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 173, at i (“Beginning in October
2015, the late CNMI Governor Eloy Inos . . . requested U.S. President Barack Obama
initiate the 902 Consultation process.”).
180. Id. at 35.
181. See Rick Perez, The Marine Corps, SAIPAN TRIBUNE (May 17, 2021),
https://bit.ly/3rvEQxX (“The Marines have long intended to maintain a fundamental
enduring presence in our Marianas Islands chain, practicing supply chain logistical work,
rotary and fixed-wing aircraft operations, and ground combat training operations across the
tactical warfighting spectrum.”).
182. Miguel D, Opinion Regarding House Joint Resolution 21-08, MARIANAS
VARIETY (July 27, 2020), https://bit.ly/3L1c1ku.
183. Rep. Tina Sablan Questions Proposed New Version of House Resolution on
Military Training, MARIANAS VARIETY (Oct. 25, 2020), https://bit.ly/3Hn1ygR.
184. Ferdie De La Torre, Torres: CNMI Never Had a Better Relationship with DOD
Than Today, SAIPAN TRIBUNE (Nov. 3, 2020), https://bit.ly/3AQQsyg (referencing the
proposed substitute version of House Joint Resolution 21-008, “pertaining to the
administration’s stance on expanded military activities in the CNMI[,]” to support an
improving relationship between the CNMI and the U.S. Department of Defense).
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games.185 Despite this decision, the Navy maintains that the relocation of
troops to Guam, and consequently CNMI, is a mandatory requirement
under an international agreement with Japan.186
Notwithstanding the Governor’s reassurances to the DOD, beginning
in 2019, steps have been taken to complicate the process of military
expansion through a repopulation program for Pagan.187 Despite the
potential for disrupting military plans, such repopulation is being framed
as the culmination of a long-term goal of returning people to their ancestral
homelands.188 Regardless, this effort has proven relatively ineffective as
legal complications with the homestead repopulation program have
resulted in no permanent resettlement as of August 2019.189 Still, these
complications have not hampered the territorial government’s ambitions,
which include stated goals of building a mayor’s office and repairing a
runway on the island.190
2. Local Uncompensated and Unfairly Compensated Takings
Before the 1990s, the Marianas Public Land Corporation facilitated
eminent domain through land exchanges.191 This land exchange program
ended in the early 1990s, in part due to corruption where “the CNMI
government vastly underpriced the public lands and traded these lands in
return for private lands worth approximately thirty-times less than the
public lands.”192 Eminent domain actions still occurred in the 1990s, but
payment was often not made. “[A] backlog of over eighty million dollars

185. See 9th Circuit: No Need to Bomb NMI Islands, SAIPAN TRIBUNE (Sept. 21,
2020), https://bit.ly/3L4kDXu (“The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals . . . also pointed out
that there is no need to bomb Tinian and Pagan in the name of national security.”).
186. See Steve Limtiaco, Those Opposed to Military Training on Tinian, Pagan, Lose
Court Appeal, PAC. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 8, 2020), https://bit.ly/3ufP6vJ (“The appeals court
also noted that halting the Guam buildup, as requested, would impact an international
agreement between the United States and Japan, which specifically requires the relocation
of Marines to Guam.”).
187. See Steve Limtiaco, CNMI Will Resettle Island U.S. Military Wants for
Training, PAC. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 10, 2019), https://bit.ly/3L667yK (“[T]he CNMI
government last week announced it will resettle the island, which was evacuated in 1981
because of an active volcano, by issuing as many as [eighty-eight] permits for agricultural
homesteads.”).
188. See id. (quoting Governor Ralph Torres, “[w]e look forward to the issuance date
and seeing residents return to their ancestral lands”).
189. See Limitaco, supra note 175.
190. Id.
191. See Blaine Rogers, Raising the Bar: The Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, the Public Land Trust, and a Heightened Standard of Fiduciary Duty, 7
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J., June 2006, at 1, 18–20 (providing a brief history of the Marianas
Public Land Corporation).
192. GREGG DE BIE, PRIVATE LANDS CONSERVATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE
NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS 56 (Nat. Res. L. Ctr., Univ. Colo. Sch. L. 2004).
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in unpaid settlements had strapped the CNMI government by 1999.”193
The result was a number of high-profile cases which ultimately led to a
ballooning debt arising from eminent domain claims.
The most significant of these cases involved land taken without
compensation by the territorial government in 1993 from Maria Mangabao
for road improvement.194 The Supreme Court of NMI entered judgment in
the amount of 18.7 million dollars against the territorial government.195
Subsequently, the local government filed multiple suits, arguing that the
court had no authority to demand the government actually pay out these
claims.196 Ultimately the court determined that it did have the authority to
compel payment, and the claims for this single taking were finally resolved
in 2017.197 In 2020, there were 184 pending monetary compensations in
CNMI resulting from eminent domain claims for public purposes of
varying reasons.198
E. Takings in American Samoa: A Unique Territory
Particularly when compared with the other U.S. Territories,
American Samoa has a relatively limited and uncontroversial history
regarding unjust takings. In American Samoa, most of the land remains in
a communal system that is culturally based and controlled mainly via a
system of nobility within the Territory’s indigenous population.199
Traditionally, aiga (extended families) “communally own virtually all
Samoan land, [and] the matais [chiefs] have authority over which family
members work what family land and where the nuclear families within the
extended family will live.”200
This system of ownership and control was affirmed in treaties and
policies that date to the 1800s. Most importantly, these land protections

193. Id.
194. See NMI Judiciary, NMI Supreme Court Hands Out Ruling in Eminent Domain
Case, SAIPAN TRIBUNE (June 29, 2012), https://bit.ly/348ekS4 (discussing Commonwealth
v. Lot No. 353 New G, 9 N. Mar. I. 44 (2012) [hereinafter Mangabao]).
195. See Ferdie De La Torre, Court Command Sought for $18.7M Judgment, SAIPAN
TRIBUNE (Jan. 10, 2017), https://bit.ly/3gy38kB.
196. See Commonwealth v. Lot No. 218-5 R/W, 9 N. Mar. I. 533, 534 (2016)
[hereinafter Quitugua].
197. See id. at 540.
198. See N. MAR. I. DEP’T PUB. LANDS, ANNUAL REPORT (2020),
https://bit.ly/3HycQyU.
199. See Merrily Stover, Individual Land Tenure in American Samoa, 11 CONTEMP.
PAC. 69, 74 (1999) (“Most of American Samoa’s land is administered as communal land.”);
see also Ian Falefuafua Tapu, Comment, Who Really is a Noble?: The Constitutionality of
American Samoa’s Matai System, 24 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 61, 79 (2020) (explaining
that the matai system is both constitutionally and statutorily protected).
200. Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 309 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting King v.
Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
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were included within the founding documents of American Samoa as a
U.S. Territory.201 The first instrument of cession specifically provided:
The Government of the United States of America shall respect and
protect the individual rights of all people dwelling in Tutuila to their
lands and other property in said District, but if the said Government
shall require any land or any other thing for Government uses, the
Government may take the same upon payment of a fair consideration
for the land or other thing to those who may be deprived of their
property on account of the desire of the Government.202

The second instrument of cession, for Manu’a, signed in 1904,
similarly provided: “It is intended and claimed by [t]hese [p]resents that
. . . the rights of the Chiefs in each village and of all people concerning
their property according to their custom shall be recognized.”203 These
provisions have continued to secure the local land rights systems, even
against eminent domain.
Unlike in Guam, where the U.S. government challenged a program
specifically meant to protect indigenous ownership, American Samoa has
maintained its system despite legal challenges. A straightforward
explanation for this is that, unlike residents of the other Territories,
American Samoans are considered non-citizen U.S. nationals.204 A recent
case challenged this position, arguing that American Samoans have “been
citizens from the start.”205 In this case, the district court held for the
plaintiffs, but the Tenth Circuit reversed.206 Part of the Tenth Circuit’s
reasoning was that American Samoa still maintains a system of indigenous
201. See Stover, supra note 199, at 75 (“The current categories of land in American
Samoa have their roots in treaty and policies of the nineteenth century.”). The law ratifying
the American Samoan cessions of land specifically stated, “[t]he existing laws of the
United States relative to public lands shall not apply to such lands in the said islands of
eastern Samoa; but the Congress of the United States shall enact special laws for their
management and disposition[.]” 48 U.S.C. § 1661(b).
202. DEP’T STATE, OFF. HISTORIAN, INSTRUMENT OF CESSION SIGNED JULY 14, 1904
BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE OF THE ISLANDS OF MANUA (1904),
https://bit.ly/3L1CSwZ.
203. DEP’T STATE, OFF. HISTORIAN, INSTRUMENT OF CESSION SIGNED ON APRIL 17,
1900, BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE OF TUTUILA (1900),
https://bit.ly/32VT9SU.
204. See Fitisemanu v. United States, 1 F.4th 862, 865 (10th Cir. 2021) (“American
Samoans are instead designated by statute ‘nationals, but not citizens, of the United
States.’” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1408)).
205. Id. at 864 (“Plaintiffs, three citizens of American Samoa, asked the district court
in Utah to . . . declare that American Samoans have been citizens from the start.”). The
question before the court was, most simply put, “whether birth in American Samoa
constitutes birth within the United States for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.
at 872. In answering this question, the Tenth Circuit noted that when tribal leaders ceded
sovereignty, the relevant documents “were silent on whether American Samoans were, or
ever would be, American citizens.” Id. at 866.
206. See id. at 864–65.

2022]

EMINENT DOMAIN AND UNFETTERED DISCRETION

639

nobility and land control that would be “threatened if birthright citizenship
were imposed.”207 The court acknowledged that the current system is
based on “communally owned lands”208 and that there are currently “racial
restrictions on land ownership requiring landowners to be at least 50%
American Samoan.”209 The Tenth Circuit concluded that “the Insular
Cases’ framework gives federal courts significant latitude to preserve
traditional cultural practices that might otherwise run afoul of individual
rights enshrined in the Constitution. This same flexibility permits courts
to defer to the preferences of indigenous peoples, so that they may chart
their own course.”210
Local customs and traditions matter in the context of land ownership
and are the principal concerns with respect to citizenship. The D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals also considered the issue of citizenship in American
Samoa in the 2015 case of Tuaua v. United States.211 The court concluded
that “[d]espite American Samoa’s lengthy relationship with the United
States, the American Samoan people have not formed a collective
consensus in favor of United States citizenship.”212 The court recognized,
“[i]n part this reluctance stems from unique kinship practices and social
structures inherent to the traditional Samoan way of life, including those
related to the Samoan system of communal land ownership.”213 The court
noted that “[r]epresentatives of the American Samoan people have long
expressed concern that the extension of United States citizenship to the
[T]erritory could potentially undermine these aspects of the Samoan way
of life.”214 In particular, granting “citizenship could result in greater
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
imperiling American Samoa’s traditional, racially-based land alienation
rules.”215
As a result of American Samoa’s unique system, the most
controversial dispute over U.S. government takings only developed in
recent years. This dispute arose from federal control of extensive portions
of the seas surrounding American Samoa.216 A 2002 rule ejected large
207. Id. at 866.
208. Id. (quoting LINE-NOUE MEMEA KRUSE, THE PACIFIC INSULAR CASE OF
AMERICAN SAMOA 2 (2018) (internal quotations omitted)).
209. Id. at 866–67 (citing AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. § 37.0204(a)–(b)).
210. Id. at 870–71.
211. Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 301 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
212. Id. at 309.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 310.
215. Id.
216. See Terr. Of Am. Sam. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 822 Fed. Appx. 650,
651–652 (9th Cir. 2020) (challenging the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1891(d) and its “impact on fishing communities, the
probable effects of increased large vessel longline fishing, and the availability of fish”).
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commercial fishing vessels from the area to “prevent the potential for gear
conflicts and catch competition.”217 This 2002 rule was adopted because
“[l]ocal fishermen and associated fishing communities depend[ed] on this
fishery not only for food, income, and employment, but also for the
preservation of their Samoan culture.”218
In February 2016, the National Marine Fisheries Service proposed a
new rule that would essentially revoke the 2002 protections of indigenous
fishing rights in the waters surrounding American Samoa.219 The proposed
rule created outrage with fears that the fish population would be
dramatically reduced, that there would be a destruction of coral reef
ecosystem resources, and that the rule would be detrimental to recreational
fishery and the growing sportfish tourism industry.220 The most significant
complaint, which would form the basis of the territorial government’s
legal challenge to this rule, was that the proposed rule ignored the Deeds
of Cession, which had protected local property rights.221
Upon the new rule’s finalization, the Territory of Samoa filed a civil
complaint against the National Marine Fisheries Service.222 The
Government of American Samoa’s position was that the Deeds of Cession
“entrust[ed] control of their lands, including the vast bodies of water
surrounding those lands, to the United States Government – in exchange
for protection and rights guaranteed by the United States.”223 Under these
Deeds of Cession, more than 28,000 square miles of property were ceded,

217. Nearshore Area Closures Around American Samoa by Vessels More than 50
Feet in Length, 67 Fed. Reg. 4,369 (Jan. 30, 2002).
218. Id.
219. See Pacific Island Pelagic Fisheries; Exemption for Large U.S. Longline Vessels
to Fish in Portions of the American Samoa Large Vessel Prohibited Area, 81 Fed. Reg.
5,619, 5,619 (Feb. 3, 2016) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 665) (“To address the current
fishery conditions, the Council recommended that NMFS allow federally permitted U.S.
longline vessels 50 ft and longer to fish in portions of the LVPA [the American Samoa
Large Vessel Prohibited Area].”).
220. See id. at 5,621 (“Several commenters said that longline fishing has dramatically
reduced fish populations around American Samoa and that this action would result in
overfishing and deplete fish stocks.”).
221. See id. at 5,623 (“[I]n the Deed of Cession . . . the United States promised to
protect the lands, . . . and the waters surrounding the islands, and . . . all the science and
environmental analysis should not supersede the rights of the people of these islands.”).
222. The territorial government’s argument was that the rule violated the Deeds of
Cession of American Samoa, and consequently was in violation of the Magnussen-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act (“MSA”). See Pl.’s Compl. At ¶ 6, Terr. of
Am. Sam. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 822 Fed. Appx. 650 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 1600095). The MSA has several stated purposes including “to help conserve and manage
fishery resources, and promote domestic commercial and recreational fishing.” Id. at ¶ 2
(citing 16 U.S.C. § 1801). Important to the argument of the territorial government was that
the MSA contains a protection stating that any plan, rule, or regulation must also be
consistent with all other applicable laws. See id. at ¶ 46 (citing 16 U.S.C. §1853(a)(1)(C)).
223. Id. at ¶ 17.
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including the Territory’s surrounding waters.224 The territorial government
pointed to two paragraphs in the Deeds containing promises from the
federal government to recognize and respect the property of the island’s
people.225 In its petition, American Samoa asserted that the new rule
“effectively eliminates alia [small boat] and cultural fishing practices.”226
The Territorial Government of American Samoa initially prevailed in
2017.227 The court concluded that the “American Samoans’ right to use
their ‘property’ to continue their customary fishing practices is reserved
by implication in the Deeds of Cession.”228 On appeal, however, the Ninth
Circuit reversed.229 American Samoa subsequently petitioned for a writ of
certiorari, placing a particular focus upon the historical reliance of the
Deeds of Cession as the “predicate for its longstanding relationship with
the U.S.”230 In this writ, American Samoa asserted that the Ninth Circuit
decision was “out of line with [the Supreme Court’s] recognition that the
United States is obligated to keep its promises to its indigenous
inhabitants.”231 Ultimately, on June 21, 2021, the Supreme Court denied
the petition.232 As a result of this denial, the 2016 rule was reinstated in
July 2021.233
F. Takings in the U.S. Virgin Islands
The history of takings within the U.S. Virgin Islands focuses
predominantly on the establishment of the Virgin Islands National Park.
Public Law 925 established the park in 1956 on the Island of St. John.234
Section 2(c) permitted the acceptance of donations of land to create the
park, under which Laurance Rockefeller donated extensive land holdings
for the project.235 By the early 1960s, the citizens of St. John faced
increasing threats of being forced off the island entirely as government
officials sought to expand the National Park through eminent domain. This
224. See id. at ¶ 21.
225. See id. at ¶ 55.
226. Id.
227. See Terr. of Am. Sam. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 16-00095, 2017
LEXIS 39470, at *45 (D. Haw. 2017) (“[T]he Deeds of Cession require the United States
to preserve American Samoan cultural fishing practices.”).
228. Id. at *44.
229. See Terr. of Am. Sam., 822 Fed. Appx. at 652.
230. Writ. Of Cert. at 17, Terr. Of Am. Sam. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 822
Fed. Appx. 650 (9th Cir. 2020).
231. Id. at 20.
232. See Terr. Of Am. Sam., v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 141 S. Ct. 2797 (2021).
233. See Pacific Island Fisheries; Exemption for Large U.S. Longline Vessels to Fish
in Portions of the American Samoa Large Vessel Prohibited Area; Court Order, 86 Fed.
Reg. 36,239, 36,240 (July 9, 2021).
234. See Act of August 2, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-925, 70 Stat. 940 (establishing Virgin
Islands National Park).
235. See 87 CONG. REC. 19,732 (1962) (statement by Rep. John Saylor).
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effort began in earnest in August 1961 when a bill to alter the boundaries
of the Virgin Islands National Park was introduced to the Senate
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.236 Senate Bill 2429 would not
ultimately pass until the following year, with a committee amendment that
proved controversial.237 The bill not only sought to further define
expansion points for the park but also “authorized [the Secretary of the
Interior] to acquire additional lands, waters, and interests by
‘condemnation or exchange.’”238
The bill was not as uniformly well received in the House, primarily
due to Representative James Rutherford of Texas, who ensured a House
debate would occur on the bill.239 Rutherford had traveled to the Virgin
Islands and consulted with the citizens of St. John, who vehemently
opposed the further use of eminent domain to expand the park.240
Proponents portrayed this expansion through condemnation as “a very
common provision in . . . national parks legislation.”241 Additionally,
supporters argued that such expansion was a mere “round[ing] out” of the
park, which had been authorized at its founding to be 9,500 acres but had
only occupied 6,200 acres as of 1962.242 Opponents viewed this bill as
having been “rushed through under a cloud of secrecy,”243 and alleged
“that the Virgin Islands National Park is somehow or other a private
preserve of Mr. Laurance Rockefeller, his friends[,] and associates.”244
Rockefeller represents a complicated figure in this dispute in that he
expressed his opposition to the condemnation; however, press from the
Virgin Islands “contended that it was he who originally sparked the bill,
including the condemnation feature.”245
Representative Jack Westland from Washington State, another
prominent supporter of the Virgin Islanders, argued that the bill was not in
keeping with self-determination for the citizens of St. John.246 Westland
saw eminent domain—as contrasted with voluntary sales—as
incompatible with self-determination. In Westland’s words, selfdetermination required that “whether these other acres are acquired or not
is up to the judgment of the people who own the properties.”247
236. See 87 CONG. REC. 16,020 (1961).
237. See 87 CONG. REC. 12,244 (1962).
238. Id. at 12,245.
239. See 87 CONG. REC. 19,732 (1962) (statement by Rep. John Saylor).
240. See id.
241. 87 CONG. REC. 19,731 (1962) (statement of Rep. Wayne Aspinall).
242. See id.
243. Id.
244. 87 CONG. REC. 19,734 (1962) (statement of Rep. James Rutherford).
245. Virgin Islanders Hail Park Defeat: Extra Land Was Sought for Facility on St.
John, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1962, at 50.
246. See 87 CONG. REC. 19,735 (1962) (statement of Rep. Jack Westland).
247. Id.
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Ultimately, the bill passed the House with an amendment proposed
by Congressman Rutherford, which struck the controversial “or by
condemnation or exchange” clause.248 The Senate passed the bill with the
House Amendments, although there was still some discomfort with the
lack of the provision, and it was suggested that a future proposal should
amend the bill to permit expropriation.249 The bill’s passage without a
condemnation clause was cause for celebration for St. John property
owners.250
G. Takings and Political Intervention
An obvious route to avoid land takings is seeking political
intervention—petitioning a higher authority that can influence or cancel a
planned project. However, such interventions are less likely to happen in
the U.S. Territories. First, some populations are more likely to focus on
day-to-day issues rather than political battles. For example, in Guam, “a
third of the population receives food stamps[,] and about [twenty-five]
percent lives below the U.S. poverty level.”251 Consequently, residents
have limited persuasive power. As journalist Blaine Harden observed in
the Washington Post, “as a [T]erritory, and without a vote in Congress, the
island has negligible lobbying power and no legal means of halting the
buildup.”252 In the words of Koohan Paik, who spent much of his
childhood in Guam, “its people have no legal route to appeal any decisions
made in Washington.”253 It is fair to say that Guam has no input in
significant decisions concerning its future—such as a decision to move
8,000 marines there or to expand the Pacific military buildup.254
Such is the common plight of the Territories, which lack voting
representation within Congress. As a result, judicial forums provide a
limited mechanism for addressing irregularities or illegalities in the
context of eminent domain.
II.

EMINENT DOMAIN CARRIES UNIQUE RISKS FOR ABUSE AND THOSE
RISKS ARE AMPLIFIED IN COMMUNITIES WITH LIMITED POLITICAL
POWER SUCH AS THE U.S. TERRITORIES AND PREDOMINANTLY
MINORITY COMMUNITIES

Part II explains the unique risks of eminent domain for communities
with limited political power, including the U.S. Territories and
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

See 87 CONG. REC. 19,736 (1962).
See 87 CONG. REC. 20,499 (1962) (statement of Sen. Clinton Anderson).
See Virgin Islanders Hail Park Defeat, supra note 245.
See Harden, supra note 97.
Id.
Paik, supra note 122.
See Harden, supra note 97.
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predominantly minority communities within the States. This Part first
discusses the history of unjust takings in the States that have
disproportionately impacted minority communities, and then explains the
risks of governments having substantial discretion in the context of
minority communities. Parts I and II together form a general critique of
how eminent domain law has failed to adequately protect property rights
in a way that is consistent with the Fifth Amendment, particularly of the
most vulnerable and disenfranchised communities, and pave the way for
Part III, which will address the specific doctrinal failures of eminent
domain law and paths for correction.
A.

Eminent Domain and Impacts on Black Communities
1. Early Twentieth Century Takings

During the twentieth century, minority homes and businesses were
often targeted to create resources used primarily or entirely by white
community members. The media has recently documented the story of
Manhattan Beach, California.255 A Black family, the Bruces, bought land
on Manhattan Beach in 1912, creating a beach and oceanfront resort
catering to Black families.256 Over time, the community became home to
multiple Black landowners and businesses.257 In 1924, the city condemned
the Bruces’ property to create a public park, ignoring this well-developed
minority community.258 Although the city paid compensation, it
effectively removed Black families from the beach area and caused the
owners to lose “their property and business”259 and move to Los
Angeles.260
Similarly, the burdens of federal takings for military purposes also
frequently fell on minority communities who were offered unequal
compensation. For example, “[i]n 1942, Harris Neck, a thriving
community of Black landowners who hunted, farmed[,] and gathered

255. See Jacey Fortin, This Black Family Ran a Thriving Beach Resort 100 Years
Ago. They Want Their Land Back., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2021), https://nyti.ms/3Hq6vFH
(detailing the story of Willa and Charles Bruce, who were “among the first Black people
to settle in Manhattan Beach, Calif[ornia]”). Currently, Los Angeles County is working out
a plan to return the property to the Bruce family. See L.A. County Leaders Mover Forward
with Returning Bruce’s Beach to Black Family, KTLA NEWS (July 14, 2021),
https://bit.ly/3L5ND1d (“Los Angeles County leaders are moving forward with a plan to
return prime beachfront property to descendants of a Black couple who built a resort for
African Americans but were stripped of the land by local city officials a century ago.”).
256. See Fortin, supra note 255.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. The county still owns the land. See id.
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oysters, was taken by the federal government to build an airstrip.” 261
“When federal officials were looking for a site for an Air Force base, the
county’s white political leaders led them past thousands of uninhabited
acres to Harris Neck.”262 The government condemned Harris Neck and
ordered the residing families to leave.263 “Black[] [residents] received an
average of $26.90 per acre for the land, while white[] [residents] received
$37.31, according to a 1985 federal report.”264 Despite the government’s
promises that residents could return after World War II, the Harris Neck
National Wildlife Refuge was established in 1962, and the land remains
the property of the Fish and Wildlife Service.265
In a virtually identical circumstance, “[t]he Espy family in Vero
Beach, Fl[orida], lost its heritage in 1942, when the U.S. government
seized its land through eminent domain to build an airfield.”266 The Espys’
property “which included a [thirty]-acre fruit grove, two houses[,] and
[forty] house lots, [was valued] at $8,000.”267 Unhappy with this valuation
of their land, the Espys sought a jury trial, where they were awarded
$13,000, which was still only one-sixth of the price of similar, neighboring
farms owned by non-Black families.268
2. Urban Renewal & Post-WWII Transportation Takings
Additionally, during the mid-twentieth century, municipalities
frequently used eminent domain to remove Blacks and other minority
communities from their property, using urban renewal as the supporting
theory.269 From 1949 to 1973, the federal government endorsed and
261. Shaila Dewan, Black Landowners Fight to Reclaim Georgia Home, N.Y. TIMES
(June 30, 2010), https://nyti.ms/3J4Zevp.
262. Id.
263. See id.
264. Id.
265. See id.
266. See Todd Lewan & Dolores Barclay, ‘When They Steal Your Land, They Steal
Your Future,’ L.A. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2001, 12:00 AM), https://lat.ms/34sOAjg.
267. Id.
268. See id.
269. See Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and
the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 6 (2003) (“By selecting
racially changing neighborhoods as blighted areas and designating them for
redevelopment, the urban renewal program enabled institutional and political elites to
relocate minority populations and entrench racial segregation.”). For studies documenting
the disproportionate impact of blight and urban renewal takings on minorities, see Martin
Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal, 1949-1962, 64–
65 (1965); see also MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOCK: HOW TEARING CITY
NEIGHBORHOODS HURTS AMERICA, AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 71–100 (2004);
Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Redefined: Revitalizing the Central City with
Resident Control, 27 U. MICH J. L. REFORM 689, 740–41 (1994) (“Numerous past
experiences indicate that the [redevelopment] process has been driven by racial animosity
as well as by bias against the poor.”).
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financed an “urban renewal” program, which resulted in the takings of
2,500 communities in 993 cities across the U.S.270 Furthermore, scholars
have argued that the concept of blight “was invented specifically for
purposes of redoing aging downtown areas, and meant, quite simply, that
buildings had lost their sparkle and their profit margin.”271 However, urban
renewal was not the only federal program that financially supported largescale takings. The federal highway program similarly helped cities clear
large areas of land and slice through other neighborhoods.272 In doing so,
highway planners “routed some highways directly, and sometimes
purposefully, through Black and brown communities.”273
In other words, the burden of the federal remaking of cities fell
unevenly. “More often than not . . . the part of the city the businessmen
thought was blighted was the part where [B]lack people lived.”274 In fact,
according to Professor Ilya Somin, “the vast majority of those uprooted
from their homes have been . . . African-Americans.”275 Indeed, according
to multiple reports, the urban renewal program was often called “the Negro
removal program.”276 Moreover, many figures from this era understate the
impact of takings on Black-Americans because condemnations
(particularly due to blight) were performed by state and local government
and therefore are not included in federal records.277

270. See FULLILOVE, supra note 269, at 4.
271. Id. at 58. Additionally, the invented concept of blight contributed to negative
perceptions of Black neighborhoods, which were “vilified as places of shame and
dysfunction.” See id. at 121. For more discussion of the blight label and stereotypes, see
Pritchett, supra note 269, at 7–8.
272. See FULLILOVE, supra note 269, at 64.
273. Noel King, A Brief History of How Racism Shaped Interstate Highways, NPR
(Apr. 7, 2021, 5:02 AM), https://n.pr/3GpBbFZ; see also Deborah N. Archer,
Transportation Policy and the Underdevelopment of Black Communities, 106 IOWA L.
REV. 2125 (2021) (exploring “the ways transportation policy and infrastructure
development have fed inequality and helped make many Black communities inhospitable
for health, success, and economic opportunity”); David Leonhardt, Fixing What Highways
Destroyed, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2021), https://nyti.ms/32UYRnS (discussing the history
of highway-related takings in Black communities during the 1950s and 1960s).
274. FULLILOVE, supra note 269, at 20.
275. The Civil Rights Implications of Eminent Domain Abuse: Testimony Before the
U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights (2011) (testimony of Ilya Somin, Assoc. Professor of Law,
George Mason Univ.).
276. See Brief for Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No.
04-108), 73 USWL 4552 (evaluating the efforts of the federal government to reduce
poverty in inner cities from 1965 through the early 1970s); see also FULLILOVE, supra note
269, at 61.
277. See Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development
Takings After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183, 269–71 (2007) (noting that “some 3.6
million people” were relocated by means of federally sponsored urban renewal
condemnations, but that “this figure does not include blight condemnations undertaken by
state and local governments on their own initiative”).
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Urban redevelopment did not just take homes; it took entire Black
communities and Black business districts.278 Many examples of Black
communities destroyed by urban renewal exist, including the Tremé
neighborhood of New Orleans;279 the Hill in Pittsburgh;280 Northwest in
Roanoke, Virginia;281 and Elmwood in Philadelphia.282 Such communitywide takings hold a special significance due to their emotional impact on
the people dispersed, who not only lose a home, but often employment and
an entire community support network.283 In the words of Mindy Fullilove,
who has studied this problem for decades, the consequences of such
takings included “social, economic, cultural, political, and emotional
losses.”284
Aside from these losses, urban renewal also contributed to a growing
housing crisis. Cities took homes and generally replaced them with
“businesses, educational and cultural institutions, and residences for
middle-and upper-income people.”285 By some counts, urban renewal
programs replaced only about two percent of the housing they
destroyed.286 According to research compiled by the U.S. Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in 1965, from 1949–1964,
the use of eminent domain to promote urban renewal led to the demolition
of 177,000 families’ and 66,000 individuals’ housing.287
According to Professor Somin, “in most cases, those displaced by
blight condemnations ended up worse off than they were before, and were
not fully compensated for their losses.”288 Black families did not receive
278. See FULLILOVE, supra note 269, at 20.
279. See Alyssa M. Hasbrouck, Note, Rethinking “Just” Compensation: Dignity
Restoration as a Basis for Supplementing Existing Takings Remedies with GovernmentSupported Community Building Initiatives, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1047, 1070 (2019)
(“During the heyday of urban renewal, ‘much of the neighborhood was destroyed with
Federal Urban Renewal funds . . . . The destruction leveled eight blocks of historic Creole
cottages and music halls, as well as other community structures, and tore out the streets
where the music flowed.’” (quoting Frances Frank Marcus, New Orleans Disputes Future
of Park on Site of Treme, Where Jazz Dug In, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 1983),
https://nyti.ms/3KB0qZ5)).
280. See FULLILOVE, supra note 269, at 60–61.
281. See id. at ch. 4.
282. See id. at ch. 5.
283. See id. at 11–14.
284. Id. at 20.
285. Id. at 58–59.
286. See id. at 59.
287. See Alvin Mushkatel, & Khalil Nakhleh, Eminent Domain: Land-use Planning
and the Powerless in the United States and Israel, 26 SOC. PROBS. 147, 149
(1978) (focusing on the effects of urban renewal on the poor and minorities in the United
States); see also Marc A. Weiss, The Origins and Legacy of Urban Renewal, in FEDERAL
HOUSING POLICIES & PROGRAMS: PAST AND PRESENT 253, 253–54 (J. Paul Mitchell ed.,
1985) (“As of June 30, 1967, approximately 400,000 residential units had been demolished
in urban renewal areas.”).
288. The Civil Rights Implications of Eminent Domain Abuse, supra note 275, at 44.

648

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 126:3

fair compensation for their homes until years later, when lawsuits were
filed across the country seeking fair payment.289 Despite urban renewal’s
decline in the 1970s, Black families continued to be disproportionately
affected by eminent domain in the United States. For example, in 1974, a
Department of Housing and Urban Development report showed that over
forty-eight percent of those forced to relocate were Black.290 A similar
report in 1975 showed that “over [forty-seven] percent of all families and
individuals reported relocated were Black.”291
More recently, according to research conducted after 2005, eminent
domain continues to affect marginalized communities disproportionately.
Census data shows that fifty-eight percent of project areas in which
eminent domain has been threatened or used for private development are
inhabited by minority residents, and twenty-five percent of these residents
live at or below the poverty line.292 As a current example, the Byhalia
Pipeline’s projected route will take property in “multiple majority-Black
neighborhoods in south-west Memphis.”293
3. A Year at a Glance: Takings in 2004
Stories of individual takings that primarily impact minority
communities continue into the twenty-first century. Consider these
examples from a single year: 2004. “In San Diego, California, a new
baseball stadium for the San Diego Padres stands as the anchor of a boom
in downtown development, which has come at the cost of the removal of
a number of low-income citizens and small businesses, many of them
Latino, through eminent domain.”294
The same year, the city of North Miami, Florida planned a
development around “improving” its minority community. 295 The city
planned to use eminent domain to help give a “face lift” to the working-

289.
290.
291.
292.

See FULLILOVE, supra note 269, at 79.
See Mushkatel & Nakhleh, supra note 287, at 150.
Id.
See DICK M. CARPENTER & JOHN K. ROSS, VICTIMIZING THE VULNERABLE: THE
DEMOGRAPHICS OF EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE 6 (Inst. Just. ed., 2007) (showing average
poverty levels for project areas and surrounding communities).
293. Leanna First-Arai, Pipeline Tells Black Memphis Landowners: Sell Us the
Rights to Your Land or Get Sued, GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2021, 5:00 PM),
https://bit.ly/3FSHlhm.
294. Paul Boudreaux, Eminent Domain, Property Rights, and the Solution of
Representation Reinforcement, 83 DENV. UNIV. L. REV. 1, 22 (2005); see also Daniel B.
Wood, San Diego Reinvents Itself - and Gentrifies, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 26,
2004), https://bit.ly/3IsspZf (Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.examining the
question, “[w]hen money pours in and property values rise, do poorer, more ethnically
diverse neighborhoods get shoved aside?”).
295. See David Ovalle, City is Banking its Future on Massive Redevelopment, MIAMI
HERALD (Jan. 5, 2004), https://bit.ly/3fTiBLv.
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class town, which holds a large Haitian population. 296 A city attorney said
that the project, which would involve the demolition of low-cost
apartments and the construction of “upscale” condos, was “social
engineering” that would greatly improve the city’s tax base.297
In Riviera Beach, Florida, in 2004, the town planned an enormous
redevelopment project that would remove more than 2,000 houses, many
of them low-cost and owned by African Americans, to allow private
development of high-rise condos, large homes, and shops.298
In Long Branch, New Jersey, in 2004, the town used “eminent
domain to condemn the residences of about 300 people, many of them
[B]lack, for redevelopment projects.” 299 In Camden, New Jersey, the town
planned
to demolish hundreds of old houses in various locations to make way
for shopping complexes and condominium and townhouse
developments. Remarkably, for a city whose population has fallen
dramatically over the past fifty years, the government claims that one
reason for the use of eminent domain is to decrease ‘density’ in the
area.300

Opponents suspected this was a pretext and argued that “the poor people
in the community, most of whom are African American or Latino, don’t
have the clout that the developers have.”301
The above examples from a single year—2004—demonstrate the
overall pattern of land takings more often falling on Black and minority
communities.
B. Eminent Domain and Indigenous Lands in the States
Although a well-documented history exists of the process of
colonization—the history of confiscating Native American lands through
settlement and violent conquest—the judicial mechanism of eminent
domain is distinct from colonization and empowered another mechanism
of dispossession for Native Americans.
Some Native American lands have been subject to eminent domain
actions because the government agreed to Native ownership of the lands

296. See id.
297. See id.
298. See Dennis Cauchon, Pushing the Limits of ‘Public Use,’ USA TODAY, Apr. 1,
2004, at 03A, 2004 WLNR 6257751.
299. Boudreaux, supra note 294, at 21.
300. Id. at 22; see also Erik Schwartz, Progress or Discrimination?, COURIER-POST,
Aug. 5, 2004, at B1, 2004 WLNR 23323720.
301. Boudreaux, supra note 294, at 22; see also Schwartz, supra note 300, at B1.
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in a treaty and later took the lands.302 In United States v. Sioux Nation of
Indians, the Sioux sought compensation for land in the Black Hills
designated as theirs under a treaty with the federal government and
subsequently taken without compensation.303 As the Supreme Court
explained the history, the initial taking was planned in 1874 by the Army,
who intended to take more than 1,000 troops and other staff and establish
a military outpost on a portion of the land.304 The expedition confirmed
the existence of substantial natural resources in the region, including
timber and gold fields.305 Subsequently, in the words of the Court, the
federal government chose to “abandon the Nation’s treaty obligation to
preserve the integrity of the Sioux territory.”306 At first, the Sioux lacked
a procedural mechanism to bring suit but ultimately were able to file a
petition for compensation in 1923. That claim was then dismissed in
1942307 because the claim was “a moral claim not protected by the Just
Compensation Clause.”308 The claim was relitigated, with the Supreme
Court ruling in 1980 that the government “effected a taking of tribal
property,” and “[t]hat taking implied an obligation on the part of the
[g]overnment to make just compensation . . . [which] must now, at last, be
paid.”309
Around the same time as the federal government crossed into Sioux
land in the Black Hills to establish a military outpost, an act of Congress
granted land that had already been reserved for the Klamath and Modoc
Tribes to the State of Oregon for the construction of a “military road.”310
A report from the Secretary of the Interior found:
The Indians have complained bitterly and have made, and continue to
make, claim for compensation for the lands taken from them. I believe
that their claim is just and that they should have reasonable
compensation, and I do not believe it fair that they should be compelled

302. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 374–77 (1980)
(“[T]he Sioux Nation has claimed that the United States unlawfully abrogated the Fort
Laramie Treaty of April 29, 1868, . . . of which the United States pledged that the Great
Sioux Reservation . . . would be ‘set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and
occupation of the Indians herein named.’”).
303. See id. at 383.
304. See id. at 376.
305. See id. at 377.
306. Id. at 378.
307. See Sioux Tribe v. United States, 97 Ct. Cl. 613, 689 (1942) (“The plaintiff tribe
is not entitled, as a matter of law, to recover from the United States, and the petition must
therefore be dismissed.”).
308. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 384.
309. Id. at 424.
310. See Klamath & Moadoc Tribes & Yahooskin Band of Snake Indians v. United
States, 85 Ct. Cl. 451, 454–55 (1937) (“By an act approved July 2, 1864, Congress granted
to the State of Oregon, to aid in the construction of a military road.”).

2022]

EMINENT DOMAIN AND UNFETTERED DISCRETION

651

to wait for a long term of years and finally employ attorneys to
prosecute their claim.311

The Secretary of the Interior suggested compensation of $108,750, and
Congress approved this amount.312 In 1937, the Court of Claims
determined that the tract’s value was $2.9 million313 and awarded
reasonable compensation—fifty years after the taking.314
Tribes have also sued regarding natural resources removed after the
establishment of the Native American lands. For example, the Navajo
sought compensation for a portion of oil and gas deposits that the U.S.
government had acquired.315 Additionally, after the U.S. purchased
Alaska, the Tlingit and Haida tribes sought compensation for their lands
and resources, which would be opened to settlement by the U.S.316 The
Court of Claims agreed that a taking had occurred and compensation was
due but failed to award any damages, leaving the issue open for future
negotiation.317
Tribes have similarly suffered improper and delayed consideration
for lands that were taken. For instance, in 1966, the federal government
took land from the Coast Indian Community in California and conveyed it
to the County of Del Norte to create an access road for timbering,
compensating only $2,500.318 A decade later, the Court of Claims agreed
with the plaintiffs’ alleged proper valuation of the land of $57,000.319
Overall, there are strong commonalities between the experiences of
Black and indigenous citizens within the States. Most importantly, both
groups have been under-compensated for their lands and natural resources
and have had to expend money on lawsuits to obtain proper compensation.

311. Id. at 456.
312. See id. at 458.
313. See id. at 457–58.
314. See id. at 460–66 (calculating the amount due to plaintiffs).
315. See Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 364 F.2d 320, 322 (Ct. Cl. 1966)
(arising out of a “series of transactions beginning in 1942, [in which] the United States
acquired certain oil and gas rights with respect to the Rattlesnake field, an area within the
Navajo Indian Reservation”).
316. See Tlingit & Haida Indians v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 452, 453 (Ct. Cl.
1959) (noting that the court was authorized to hear “claims, legal or equitable for lands or
other tribal or community property rights taken from the Tlingit and Haida Indians by the
United States without compensation”).
317. See id. at 467 (“[I]t seems clear that the United States both failed and refused to
protect the interests of these Indians in their lands and other property in southeastern
Alaska . . . and that the United States is liable . . . to compensate the Indians for the losses
so sustained.”).
318. See Coast Indian Cmty. v. United States, 550 F.2d 639, 641 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
319. See id.
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C. The Patterns of Injustice in Eminent Domain
Stories of eminent domain from minority communities within the
States mirror those from the U.S. Territories in multiple ways.
Specifically, there are three key patterns of injustices in eminent domain
that affect minority communities in both the States and the Territories.
First, eminent domain actions in both the States and Territories have
involved large-scale federally financed actions, such as military
expansion, highway construction, and urban renewal.320 Such projects
provide federal financing for what ultimately become local endeavors,
allowing military authorities or cities and counties to decide what land is
taken and how much is taken, with limited federal oversight. There are no
protection mechanisms that might eliminate bias in this process.
Meanwhile, federal programming and funding supports and encourages
extensive use of eminent domain, often at the hands of appointed—rather
than elected—officials.
Second, local governments have also dispossessed minority
communities in both the States and Territories in unjust ways that
demonstrate bias.321 The federal government is not alone as a problematic
actor. Territorial governments, states, counties, cities, and towns have
similarly behaved in ways that demonstrate bias.
Finally, minority communities in both the States and Territories have
been compensated inadequately and with significant delay.322 Landowners
have been forced to file suit to obtain proper compensation, following
procedures that do not provide for an attorney’s fees and waiting years or
decades for appropriate compensation.
Each facet of these patterns of unjust takings provides insight into the
failures of eminent domain law, particularly in the context of communities
with less political power. The remainder of this Article draws on these
patterns of injustice to critique eminent domain law and develop a discrete
set of recommendations to address the problem.
III. THE LIMITED INDIRECT OPTIONS FOR EMINENT DOMAIN
CHALLENGES
If eminent domain law is not adequately protecting Americans, then
the question becomes whether other areas of law step in to fill that gap and
respond to concerns such as the treatment of Black and indigenous
peoples. This Part examines the alternative claims that a plaintiff may
consider when contesting an eminent domain action and evaluates the
effectiveness of these alternatives in preventing a land taking.
320. See supra Sections I.B.–II.B.
321. See supra Sections II.A–B.
322. See supra Sections II.A–B.
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A. Eminent Domain and Abuse of Discretion
Compare the lenient legislative deference standard with review of an
agency action, where the court questions whether there was an abuse of
discretion. Why do these, admittedly minimal, protections on power not
exist in the context of eminent domain? The reason is simple: the eminent
domain power is an attribute of state sovereignty,323 even when exercised
via a municipality.324 The lenient approach to review is a reflection of the
“wide birth afforded to states and municipalities in the exercise of that
particular sovereign power.”325 This is a departure from the normal
Supreme Court position that an agency “action may not be upheld on
grounds other than those relied on by the agency.”326 In the context of
eminent domain, and as a concession to state sovereignty, the Supreme
Court enforces a far more lenient rule, upholding takings if they are
“rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.”327 As a result,
attempting to challenge the necessity of a taking is essentially a futile
gesture because, for the past century, the Supreme Court has consistently
approached the question of land takings as one that is “purely political,
does not require a hearing, and is not the subject of judicial inquiry.”328
This extensive scope of discretion, in terms of the necessity and context,
means that abuse of discretion considerations focus specifically on the two

323. See Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924) (“The power of eminent
domain is an attribute of sovereignty, and inheres in every independent State.”).
Additionally, when the eminent domain power is conferred by the state on a local body
such as a municipality, the court recognizes the same “wide birth afforded . . . in the
exercise of that particular sovereign power.” Hsiung v. Honolulu, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1258,
1265 (D. Haw. 2005). In short, “the necessity and expediency of the taking of property for
public use ‘are legislative questions, no matter who may be charged with their decision.’”
N. Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 284 (1925) (quoting Joslin Mfg. Co. v.
Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 677 (1923)).
324. See Joslin Mfg., 262 U.S. at 678 (holding that delegation of the eminent domain
power and its related process of finding a public purpose were not “any longer open to
question in this court”). The eminent domain power may be delegated, but “may be
resumed at will.” Chattanooga, 264 U.S. at 480 (citing Pa. Hosp. v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S.
20 (1917) (holding that the eminent domain power of the state is so crucial to sovereignty
that it cannot be abridged, even by an agreement made by the state)). This is because a
“sovereign can never be contractually bound to surrender ‘an essential attribute of its
sovereignty.’” Hsiung, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 1266. The eminent domain power is one of those
essential attributes of sovereignty. See W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 522 (1848)
(describing eminent domain as “an essential and indispensable attribute of sovereignty”).
325. Hsiung, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 1265.
326. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 420 (1992)
(citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943)).
327. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
328. Joslin Mfg., 262 U.S. at 678.
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constitutional limits of eminent domain: public purpose and just
compensation.329
Concerning public purpose, such abuse of discretion review appears
to be administered with an extremely light touch. For example, a recent
Mississippi Supreme Court case involved a claim that the City of Clinton
“did not exhaust all other options before resorting to eminent domain.”330
The court simply responded that such an argument “fail[ed] to consider
[the state’s] jurisprudence” because the applicable standard of review is
“evidence indicative of fraud or abuse of discretion.”331 Similarly, abuse
of discretion is used to review lower court decisions on whether the
government used blight or urban renewal, which is generally accepted as
a public purpose,332 as a pretext for a taking.333
Regarding just compensation, state courts generally establish rules
and procedures for determining property values, including what types of
market value evidence to consider or exclude, such as which properties
count for comparable sales. 334 In doing so, these courts utilize an abuse of
discretion standard.335 Federal cases challenging market value follow the

329. For example, when setting up “special courts of eminent domain,” Mississippi
adopted abuse of discretion as the standard of review for decisions of the court. See
Wiggins v. Clinton Miss., 298 So. 3d 962, 964 (Miss. 2020) (reviewing on appeal, for
abuse of discretion, the issues of whether the city lacked the legal authority to make the
taking and whether there was a public use or public necessity for the taking).
330. Wiggins, 298 So. 3d at 965.
331. Id.
332. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954) (rejecting a claim that the District
of Columbia Redevelopment Act violated the Fifth Amendment and holding that, via the
police powers, the jurisdiction was authorized to act in furtherance of public health and
safety via eminent domain); see also Paulk v. Hous. Auth. of Tupelo, 195 So. 2d 488 (Miss.
1967) (accepting that urban renewal is a public purpose in Mississippi).
333. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005) (“Nor would the
City be allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual
purpose was to bestow a private benefit.”); see also Wiggins, 298 So. 3d at 964 (considering
whether urban renewal was a “sham” created by a city for an otherwise retaliatory taking).
334. See Atkinson v. Seminole Pipeline Co., NO. 03-96-00245-CV, 1998 Tex. App.
LEXIS 2364, at *12–13 (Tex. App. Apr. 24, 1998) (considering whether the trial court
erred in excluding certain comparable property sales).
335. See State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n. v. Wetterau Foods, Inc., 632 S.W.2d
88, 90 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (“Admission of evidence of comparable sales rests in the broad
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless the discretion is clearly abused.”
(citations omitted)); see also Stine v. Commonwealth Dep’t of Transp., 364 A.2d 745, 748
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976) (applying the abuse of discretion standard in the eminent domain
context “especially when the lower court has viewed the premises”); City of Enid v.
Moyers, 165 P.2d 818, 820 (Okla. 1945) (“While the range of inquiry as to such value rests
largely in the discretion of the trial court, and the action of the trial court in admitting or
excluding evidence as to value will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of such
discretion.” (citing State v. Winters, 156 P.2d 798 (Okla. 1945))).
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same pattern, using an abuse of discretion standard specifically tied to the
question of evidence.336
In sum, the abuse of discretion concept focuses on the two core
constitutional limits of public purpose and just compensation. In those
contexts, abuse of discretion acts primarily as an evidentiary standard.
Abuse of discretion does not provide an additional or independent standard
for making a collateral attack on an eminent domain action.
B. Equal Protection
Although equal protection arguments have not been particularly
successful in the context of eminent domain challenges, courts seem
somewhat open to considering a well-developed equal protection case. In
Whittaker v. County of Lawrence,337 the plaintiffs alleged both substantive
due process and equal protection violations, arguing that they experienced
“‘intentional and arbitrary discrimination’ without a rational basis” as a
class of one.338 The Third Circuit dismissed both claims, finding no proof
of an illegitimate government interest or arbitrary singling out of the
landowner’s property that would substantiate an equal protection claim.339
Conversely, the plaintiffs in New West, L.P. v. City of Joliet340 found
more success through equal protection. In this case, the claim arose from
a city’s attempt to condemn an apartment complex that it considered
“rundown.”341 The partnership of tenants alleged that the city violated (1)
the Equal Protection Clause by litigating and lobbying the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) not to renew the complex’s
federal subsidy; and (2) the Fair Housing Act by “discouraging current and
prospective minority tenants from living in” the apartment complex.342
The Seventh Circuit remanded the allegations for further discussion.343
C. Due Process
Although cases styled as due process challenges to eminent domain
proceedings attempt to separate due process from violating the public
purpose requirement, courts have engaged in a longstanding pattern of

336. See, e.g., United States v. 33.90 Acres of Land, 709 F.2d 1012, 1013 (5th Cir.
1983) (applying the abuse of discretion standard to evaluate an exclusion of evidence
regarding comparable sales of properties to set the market value of the condemned land).
337. Whittaker v. County of Lawrence, 437 F. App’x 105, 108–09 (3d Cir. 2011).
338. Id. at 109 (citing Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)).
339. See id. at 109–10.
340. New W., L.P. v. City of Joliet, 491 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2007).
341. See id. at 719 (“Joliet thinks that Evergreen Terrace, built in 1965, is so
run-down that it is a public nuisance.”).
342. Id. at 719, 721.
343. See id. at 722.
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treating the two as effectively one question.344 Even though this may add
an independent count to the complaint, the analysis is not substantively
different than simply challenging whether there was a public purpose, so
long as the court analyzes the claim using the legislative deference
standard from eminent domain.
For instance, in City of Cincinnati v. Vester,345 the city proposed a
street widening project requiring condemnation of additional land
unrelated to the improvement. The landowners alleged a due process
violation because the city’s plan to “us[e] or dispos[e] of its excess”
through sale was not a public use.346 The Sixth Circuit agreed that this
excess condemnation did not amount to a public use and held that there
was a due process violation because “property may [not] be taken for the
purpose of selling it at a profit and paying for the improvement.”347
In Port of Umatilla v. Richmond,348 a landowner claimed that the port
commission was “attempting to condemn and acquire [an acreage far in
excess than can be used] for the purpose of selling and leasing such real
property to private investors.”349 The Supreme Court of Oregon stated that
the Due Process Clause protects landowners from takings under the
“pretense of eminent domain” rather than a proper public use.350
To the degree that substantive due process offers a distinct claim from
a failure to state a public purpose, the standard for proving a violation is
extraordinarily high.351 In Whittaker v. County of Lawrence,352 plaintiffs
challenged an eminent domain action, arguing a violation of due process
because their land was taken “despite no indication of blight,” where
Pennsylvania’s Urban Redevelopment Law required a finding of blight for
a permissible taking.353 The Third Circuit affirmed that “[i]n reviewing the

344. See, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 159 (1896)
(considering “the question as to what is due process of law, and, as incident thereto, what
is a public use”).
345. Cincinnati v. Vester, 33 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1929), aff’d, 281 U.S. 439 (1930).
346. See id. at 243.
347. Id. at 245.
348. Port of Umatilla v. Richmond, 321 P.2d 338 (Or. 1958).
349. Id. at 340.
350. See id. at 353; see also State ex rel. Wash. State Convention & Trade Ctr. v.
Evans, 966 P.2d 1252, 1258–59 (Wash. 1998) (“Fraud or constructive fraud would occur
if the public use was merely a pretext to effectuate a private use on the condemned lands.”);
Barr v. New Brunswick, 67 F. 402, 403 (C.C.D.N.J. 1895) (questioning whether the taking
is for public use and not an “arbitrary exercise of the power of the government”).
351. But see King Cnty. v. Theilman, 369 P.2d 503, 505 (Wash. 1962) (finding that
the taking was not a necessity, “when by changing the route slightly and putting in a cut
and a turn on the [Highland Development Company] property you can get an equally
satisfactory road with an equally satisfactory grade”).
352. Whittaker v. County of Lawrence, 437 F. App’x 105 (3d Cir. 2011).
353. See id. at 108.
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conduct of executive officials, only conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’
rises to the level of a substantive due process violation.”354
D. National Environmental Policy Act
The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)355 applies
specifically to “major federal actions” and therefore applies only to the
eminent domain actions of the federal government. NEPA does not apply
to the myriad of municipal level eminent domain actions. Nevertheless,
NEPA remains important due to the history of eminent domain as a part
of military buildup and expansion.356
NEPA requires federal agencies to assess the environmental impacts
of their planned projects, creating an “Environmental Impact Statement”
(“EIS”).357 As a part of evaluating these impacts, the agency must “prepare
‘a detailed statement’ discussing, inter alia, ‘alternatives to the proposed
action.’”358 As its focus is primarily procedural,359 it is critical to recognize
that NEPA is not truly a mechanism that would be likely to be effective as
a collateral attack on an eminent domain action. With that said, the
“linchpin” of assessing environmental impacts is considering alternative
actions,360 potentially including alternative sites for a project,361 and
354. Id. (citing Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)).
355. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
356. See supra Part II.
357. See Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1285 (1st Cir. 1996) (“The
primary mechanism for implementing NEPA is the Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS).”).
358. Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1068, 1072 (1st Cir. 1980) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)); see also Roosevelt Campobello Int’l Park Com. v. U.S. EPA, 684
F.2d 1041, 1047 (1st Cir. 1982) (“EPA’s duty under NEPA is to study all alternatives that
‘appear reasonable and appropriate for study at the time’ of drafting the EIS, as well as
‘significant alternatives’ suggested by other agencies or the public during the comment
period.” (quoting Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. NRC, 598 F.2d 1221, 1228–33 (1st
Cir. 1979))).
359. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 558 (1978) (“NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its
mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural.”); see also Brodsky v. U.S. Nuclear
Regul. Comm’n, 704 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 2013) (“NEPA is, at its core, ‘a procedural
statute that mandates a process rather than a particular result.’” (quoting Stewart Park &
Reserve Coal., Inc. v. Slater, 352 F.3d 545, 557 (2d Cir. 2003))); see also Cellular Phone
Taskforce v. FCC, 205 F.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that “as long as all the significant
potential environmental impacts are considered in a combination of general and sitespecific assessments at the time the facilities are constructed, the requirements of NEPA
and the CEQ have been satisfied” (citing Env’t Coal. of Ojai v. Brown, 72 F.3d 1411, 1418
(9th Cir. 1995))).
360. See Monroe Cty. Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 697–98
(2d Cir. 1972) (“The requirement for a thorough study and a detailed description of
alternatives . . . is the linchpin of the entire impact statement.”).
361. See Roosevelt, 684 F.2d at 1047 (noting that the agency should study alternative
sites if there is “tangible evidence that an alternative site might offer ‘a substantial measure
of superiority.’” (quoting Seacoast, 598 F.2d at 1228–33)).
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always including the option of taking no action,362 a choice that would
remove the need for eminent domain. Additionally, although its
requirements are officially procedural, the EIS may also be viewed as “an
action-forcing procedure, designed to ensure that [the broad national
commitment to protecting and promoting environmental quality] is
infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal
Government.”363
Plaintiffs have utilized NEPA as a part of challenges to eminent
domain actions within the U.S. mainland and Territories. For example, in
Allegheny Defense Project v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,364
an environmental group and homeowners challenged condemnations for a
pipeline project, relying on NEPA and the Due Process Clause.365
Additionally, landowners in United States v. 178.15 Acres of Land366
alleged that the government “lacked the power to exercise . . .
eminent domain over their lands because of its failure to file an [EIS] in
accordance with . . . [NEPA] . . . prior to the taking.”367 The Fourth Circuit
simply found that it “perceive[d] no merit in any of these contentions” and
upheld the taking.368
A NEPA challenge also forms a significant part of the story of Guam
and CNMI’s fight against land takings by the U.S. military. In 2009, the
DOD released its Draft Environmental Impact Statement (“DEIS”) related
to the planned military buildup on Guam. The DEIS detailed the
significant implications for both property and infrastructure, such as a
roughly forty-one percent increase in population in just a few years,
extensive building projects, and potential damage to fishing in the area due
to extensive dredging.369 The implications for land takings were
extraordinary in terms of the U.S. military’s intentions: “hundreds of acres
of jungle may be bulldozed to create housing for [U.S.] Marines, more
than one thousand acres of new land may be leased to build five new firing
ranges, and new training facilities may be built on Pagan and Tinian [in
the nearby CNMI].”370 The scale of the project was extraordinary, with it

362. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(d) (“Include the alternative of no action . . . .”); see
also Pac. Coast Fed’n. of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Dept. of Int., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1039,
1048 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“Among the alternatives required to be discussed in every EA or
EIS is the ‘no action’ alternative.”).
363. Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1285 (1st Cir. 1996).
364. Allegheny Def. Project v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 964 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
2020).
365. See id. at 9.
366. United States v. 178.15 Acres of Land, 543 F.2d 1391 (4th Cir. 1976).
367. Id. at 1391.
368. Id.
369. See Na’puti & Bevacqua, supra note 118, at 845.
370. Id.

2022]

EMINENT DOMAIN AND UNFETTERED DISCRETION

659

being “the largest single project ever proposed by the DOD, totaling an
estimated $15 billion.”371
Moreover, the project proposed acquiring 950 acres at Pâgat Village,
a noted local historical site on the Guam National Register of Historic
Places.372 The DEIS took essentially no notice of the cultural and social
implications of the takings, being “written as if Guam’s people, land[,] and
culture counted for nothing.”373 Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Energy, Installations and Environment, Jackalyne Pfannenstiel, quite
astonishingly argued that “preservation of the Pagat village site, as a very
special cultural place for Guam, is consistent with the training range.”374
The DEIS provoked what has been called “the most blistering
responses ever to come from the Environmental Protection Agency.”375
Moreover, many of the EPA’s concerns flowed directly from the plan for
extensive eminent domain: “Hundreds of acres of jungle and wetlands
habitat will be covered with concrete and tract developments in order to
house tens of thousands of newcomers.”376
By 2010, the National Trust for Historic Preservation, among other
organizations, filed suit against the DOD. 377 Madeleine Bordallo, a nonvoting delegate for Guam, suspected that the needed land could never be
purchased, stating, “I frankly remain very skeptical that the preferred
alternative will be achieved. And I’m adamantly opposed to the use of
eminent domain to acquire these lands, if local landowners are not willing
to sell or lease.”378
In 2013, the DOD issued a supplemental EIS, which provoked a
subsequent NEPA challenge alleging that the Navy
failed to mention its plans to convent CNMI land into military training
ranges when it released the 2010 Environmental Impact Statement, or
EIS, for the relocation of around 5,000 Marines from Okinawa to
Guam. Instead, it waited five years to announce a separate program,
the Commonwealth Joint Military Training, or CJMT program, which

371. Id. The scale of this project is particularly notable when you consider the scale
of the tiny island. Sen. Mary Camacho Torres wrote about this problem, citing a public law
adopted by Guam, which states: “the size of the Territory presents rigorous constraints on
potential activities and limits options for development. In a small island environment such
as that which exists in Guam, even isolated activities imply certain potential impacts.
Resources are scarce and particularly fragile. Environmental, visual, social and economic
impacts can be felt immediately throughout the entire island.” Torres, supra note 168.
372. See id.
373. Paik, supra note 122.
374. Pat Host, Guam Delegate Skeptical of Navy’s Preferred Site for Marines’
Relocation, INSIDE PENTAGON, July 29, 2010, at 14.
375. Paik, supra note 122.
376. Id.
377. See Host, supra note 374, at 14.
378. Id.
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advocates for the use of the northern two-thirds of Tinian and the entire
island of Pagan as military training ranges, primarily by the relocated
marines.379

The suit alleged that this separation of projections was an “illegal
segmentation” of the EIS and “a failure to be transparent.”380
The Federal District Court ultimately granted summary judgment for
the Navy.381 Regarding the challenges to the EIS, the District Court
concluded that it was reasonable for the Navy to examine the two plans—
the relocation of troops from Okinawa to Guam and the construction of
training facilities in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands—separately because these plans did not relate to “connected
actions.”382 Additionally, the court found that it was acceptable for the
Navy not to address the cumulative impacts of these plans until a
subsequent EIS.383
The Ninth Circuit subsequently reviewed and concluded that the
actions were “not connected for the purposes of an environmental impact
statement.”384 The court found that “the two actions have overlapping
goals” but denied their connected status because they also had
“independent utility.”385 The court based its reasoning on the idea that
“while it may be more convenient for the Marines to have these training
facilities closer, there is no evidence showing they must be.”386
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit also determined that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to challenge the troop relocation because changing the relocation
plans would involve altering a U.S. treaty with Japan.387
In sum, NEPA can be a useful tool in the eminent domain context.
However, NEPA also lacks force because it indirectly approaches the
problem and focuses on procedure rather than substance. A better or more

379. Sophia Perez, Governor Remains Opposed to Military’s Plans, GUAM DAILY
POST (Aug. 29, 2018), https://bit.ly/3AExdIj.
380. Id.
381. Tinian Women Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, No. 16-cv-00022, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 143988, at *4 (D. N. Mar. I. Aug. 22, 2018).
382. See id. at *43 (“[T]he Court concludes that the Relocation EIS serves the
independent purpose of fulfilling international obligations to Japan, and the CJMT EIS
serves the independent purpose of evaluating the training facilities required.”).
383. See id. at *55–56 (“[W]hile there may be cumulative impacts from the actions
resulting from the relocation of Marines and the CJMT proposal, there is no NEPA
violation because Defendants have committed to assessing these impacts in the CJMT
EIS.”).
384. Tinian Women Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 976 F.3d 832, 834 (9th Cir.
2020).
385. Id. at 838.
386. Id. (emphasis in original).
387. See id. at 840 (“TWA’s second claim is not redressable by the judicial branch
and must be dismissed for lack of standing.”).
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thorough environmental assessment might or might not actually impact the
existence or scope of an eminent domain project.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENSURE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF PROPERTY CONSISTENT WITH
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
This final Part reflects on the historical patterns of unjust takings in
the U.S. Territories. The first Section engages the history of race and
property law, focusing narrowly on the continuing implications for
eminent domain. Then, three additional Sections set forth three specific
problems with eminent domain law as it stands, particularly as a tool to
protect indigenous peoples of the Territories. Each Section then articulates
a discrete method of making practical changes to existing Supreme Court
precedent in ways that are consistent with other doctrines and precedents.
A. Eminent Domain and the Problem of Political Power in the U.S.
Mainland and the Territories
Given the demographics of the communities most likely to be directly
impacted by eminent domain, it is crucial to recognize that eminent
domain often occurs in contexts where a government entity wants to either
(1) control access or designate who belongs in an area, or (2) determine
the best use of a property. Due to the history of race, property, and law in
the U.S, both contexts offer unique challenges when the subject lands are
populated by predominantly minority residents.
With respect to access or designating who belongs in an area, ample
evidence demonstrates that white people regularly attempt to exclude
Black people from shared spaces. Professors Taja-Nia Y. Henderson &
Jamila Jefferson-Jones recently wrote about “white Americans calling the
police when they perceived that Black people were occupying spaces [like
public parks] where they ought not to be.”388 Henderson and JeffersonJones concluded that the “casting of Blackness as a property harm” was “a
deep-seated phenomenon that has been pervasive throughout U.S.
history.”389 Their scholarship details a history of utilizing “the language of
land use, particularly that of nuisance and trespass,” as a mechanism to
“exclude Blacks from various shared spaces.”390
388. Taja-Nia Y. Henderson & Jamila Jefferson-Jones, #LivingWhileBlack:
Blackness as Nuisance, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 863, 865 (2020).
389. Id. at 870; see also Addie C. Rolnick, Defending White Space, 40 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1639, 1649 (2019) (“For Black people in White spaces, whose bodies carry the weight
of cultural myths about danger and criminality and who may at any time be viewed as
suspicious, threatening, or out of place by their neighbors, self-defense laws are a reminder
that the law condones, and even encourages, fear-based violence against them.”).
390. Henderson & Jefferson-Jones, supra note 388, at 871.
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The U.S. has a history of racial exclusion in property, from
segregation to restrictive covenants,391 and segregated spaces have both
shaped and continue to dominate the American landscape.392
Unsurprisingly, “[t]he story of [B]lack resistance is also profoundly
spatial. For example, [B]lacks vigorously contested the denial of civil
rights to travel freely and enter public spaces through sit-ins, marches, and
other actions that operated on a spatial plane.”393 In essence, the question
of who belongs has long been racialized and has played out not only
socially but also spatially in property.
It is against this canvas that we paint the story of eminent domain
law. Eminent domain projects can effectively decide who belongs in an
area—particularly in the context of urban development.
B. Overturn Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co.
The pattern of acknowledging that compensation is due but failing to
provide that compensation for years or decades after a taking is at the core
of the history of unjust takings in the U.S. Territories.394 The Supreme
Court’s decision in Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co.395 is
a key mechanism that makes this possible because the Court only required
“provision for compensation” rather than actually requiring “just
compensation.” The Supreme Court minimized the requirements of the
Fifth Amendment, finding that “[t]he Constitution declares that private
property shall not be taken ‘for public use without just compensation.’ It
does not provide or require that compensation shall be actually paid in
advance of the occupancy of the land to be taken.”396 Instead, the Court
found that the Constitution only demanded “reasonable, certain[,] and
adequate provision for obtaining compensation before . . . occupancy is
disturbed.”397

391. See generally Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (discussing the history of
racial segregation in the United States and arguing that this segregation had significant
economic consequences).
392. See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in
Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1913 (1994) (“[C]ontemporary society, through
the mechanism of law, creates and perpetuates racially identified spaces without doing so
explicitly.”); see also Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional
Formation and Racial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1366 (1997) (examining racial
hierarchy and segregation, particularly in public institutions).
393. Elise C. Boddie, Racial Territoriality, 58 UCLA L. REV. 401, 407 n.32 (2010).
394. See supra Part II.
395. Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890).
396. Id.
397. Id.
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Five years later, the Supreme Court’s decision in Sweet v. Rechel398
supported Cherokee Nation by emphasizing the “provision for reasonable
compensation” rather than direct, immediate, or contemporaneous
payment.399 Recently, the Third Circuit relied substantially on Cherokee
Nation to find that the “established law” does not require payment in
advance of dispossession.400 The Third Circuit added, “In addition,
compensation need not be paid contemporaneously with the taking;
instead, the Fifth Amendment requires only that a provision for payment
must be available.”401
Cherokee Nation’s holding does not meet the standard of the Fifth
Amendment. Our constitutional guarantee is for just compensation, not a
promise to make just compensation in the future. Indeed, Cherokee Nation
stands in stark contrast to the well-litigated standard for just compensation:
a true market value of the property, often based meticulously on
comparisons to sales that are similar both in their timing and in the location
of the property. Our well-established idea of just compensation is based
on a normal market transaction. Such a normal market transaction is one
where the payment proceeds possession.
Finally, a provision for compensation is not compensation. Rather,
such provision is effectively a promise to make payment. A promise is not
always certain. The frequency of municipal bankruptcies alone should
convince us that such promises are not very likely to be kept. Moreover,
the history of land takings in the Territories demonstrates the likelihood of
the government’s delayed and diminished payments to less powerful,
minority populations. The straightforward solution is to overturn
Cherokee Nation, which, as the law stands, effectively prevents an
immediate suit for payment. Overturning Cherokee Nation would be a
substantial step forward in protecting our constitutional property rights
generally, and such a change would particularly benefit minority
communities. The history detailed in this article demonstrates that a
provision for compensation is not an effective protection of the right to
just compensation. The existence of a procedural mechanism, no matter
how cumbersome or late, provides poor protection for a right so clear in

398. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380 (1895)
399. Id. at 399 (“When, however, the legislature provides for the actual taking and
appropriation of private property for public uses, authority to enact such a regulation rests
upon its right of eminent domain,—a right vital to the existence and safety of government.
But it is a condition precedent to the exercise of such power that the statute make provision
for reasonable compensation to the owner.”).
400. See Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907
F.3d 725, 737 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[D]ue process does not require that condemnation of land
to be in advance of its occupation by the condemning authority.”).
401. Id.

664

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 126:3

the text of the Constitution. The appropriate standard is the standard
articulated in the Constitution: just compensation.
C. Replace Legislative Discretion with Intermediate Scrutiny Where
Plaintiff-Landowners Are Members of a Protected Class
Minority communities—specifically Black communities in the States
and indigenous communities in the Territories—are more likely to be
subjects of an eminent domain action.402 The history of race and property
within the U.S. is riddled with bias and exclusion. Moreover, two
frequently racialized questions underpin eminent domain: who belongs in
the space and what is the best use of the space. In this context, a standard
of legislative discretion, which translates to municipal discretion given the
number of local takings, is highly likely to overlook racially-biased
decision-making.
In light of the history of bias in property law—and particularly
eminent domain law—as well as the existence of a far higher level of
scrutiny in an ordinary equal protection case based on race, courts should
embrace a standard of intermediate scrutiny. Such a standard recognizes
the systemic likelihood of bias in the eminent domain context. Moreover,
an intermediate scrutiny standard balances the recognition of sovereignty
and the need for some government leeway in practically accomplishing
infrastructure projects.
D. Articulate a Standard for Equal Protection Challenges Based on
Race and Eminent Domain
Equal protection has not been a fruitful ground for challenges to
eminent domain actions, mainly because such challenges have been
limited in number and viewed essentially as outside of eminent domain’s
basic public use and just compensation framework. However, given the
evidence of how eminent domain actions have disproportionately
impacted Black and indigenous communities, courts should be as open to
equal protection as an independent ground for challenging an eminent
domain action as they would be to an equal protection challenge in another
context. When a state or city government acts in a prejudiced manner
regarding the processing and payment of takings claims or the selection of
property for taking, such claims should be considered under the equal
protection framework rather than being relegated solely to the eminent
domain context—where a lack of protective standards fosters unequal
treatment. Therefore, the Supreme Court should articulate a standard for
402. See Brief for Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No.
04-108), 73 USWL 4552.
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an equal protection violation in this context when the next case presents
itself.
V.

CONCLUSION

The legal history of unjust land takings within the U.S. Territories is
a neglected topic that is useful for developing patterns of problems
originating within eminent domain law. These patterns demonstrate that
eminent domain law fails to protect private property adequately.
Unfettered legislative discretion invites racial bias in the context of
deciding two key questions that underpin eminent domain actions: who
belongs there and what use of the land is best. Additionally, courts
unreasonably tolerate delays in payments on eminent domain claims—a
trend wholly inconsistent with the otherwise transactional emphasis on
just compensation. Finally, no other area of law, such as equal protection
or due process, intervenes to provide adequate property protection.
This Article endorses three specific and complementary routes to
achieving more just property protections in the context of eminent domain.
First, the Supreme Court should overturn Cherokee Nation v. Southern
Kansas Railroad Co., which justifies delayed compensation and is
inconsistent with other precedents that emphasize ordinary land
transactional approaches to just compensation. Second, in keeping with
equal protection laws, the Court should recognize the dangers of unfettered
legislative discretion and adopt a more intensive review in the context of
takings of Black and indigenous land. Finally, in keeping with equal
protection rulings in other contexts, the Court should articulate a standard
for an equal protection violation in the context of eminent domain.

